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Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Markets Failure
By John C. Coffee, Jr.
  Introduction: Corporate Governance Rediscovered
A specter is haunting neo-classical corporate finance theory.1  It is the specter that law
matters- - that a positive theory of the firm is incomplete unless it incorporates and explains the
role of legal variables.  Recent research on corporate governance has found systematic differences
among nations in ownership concentration, capital market development, the value of voting
1 This reference is to a quotation from a now obscure 19th  Century
economist, Karl Marx, who coined the phrase in 1848.  See Karl Marx and
Freidrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1898) (observing that the
specter of Communism was haunting Europe).  Younger scholars are not expected
to be familiar with this material.
rights, and the use of external finance.2  More importantly, these differences seem to correlate
closely with the strength of the legal protections given minority investors.3  In turn, this level of
legal protection seems to depend upon, and vary systematically with, the nature and 
2 The principal efforts have been by four financial economists,
writing jointly, who are sometimes called “the Gang of Four,” but will be hereafter
more neutrally referenced as “LLS&V.” See, e.g., Rafael LaPorta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanos, and Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World,
54 J. Fin. 471 (1999); LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanos, Shleifer & Vishny, Law and
Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998); LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanos, Shleifer &
Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997).  For
another provocative effort in this same vein, see Simon Johnson, Peter Boone,
Alasdair Breach, and Eric Friedman, “Corporate Governance in the Asian
Financial Crisis, 1997-1998" (Working Paper 1999).
3 For the latest commentary by LLS & V on this theme, see LaPorta,
Lopez-de- Silanos, Shleifer & Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate
Governance, (Working Paper, June 1999).
origins of each nation’s legal system.  In particular, common law legal systems seem to vastly
outperform civil law legal systems (and particularly French civil law systems) in providing
investor protections- - and, in turn, encouraging capital market growth and ownership dispersion.
The size, depth and liquidity of securities markets has clearly been found to correlate directly
with the quality of the legal protections given shareholders.  In consequence, because the nature
and quality of these protections differs widely across nations,  the corporate world subdivides
today into rival systems of dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership, with different
structures of corporate governance characterizing each.4
A paradigm shift is now underway in the manner in which financial economics views
corporate governance, with the new scholarship emphasizing both the centrality of legal
protections for minority shareholders and the possibility that regulation can outperform private
contracting.5  Although this article recognizes the importance of this transition, it is far more
skeptical about whether this new scholarship  has identified the critical elements that have given
the “common law” nations a comparative advantage over the “civil law” world.   Here, a mystery
remains.  One possibility is that substantive differences in corporate law may matter far less than
4 Although these systems may seem static, individual firms can
migrate from one to the other, principally by listing on a stock exchange in a
“dispersed ownership” nation.  I have suggested elsewhere that such migration and
the need for global scale is destabilizing the traditional concentrated ownership
system.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev.
641 (1999).
5 Financial economics, as a field, has long been skeptical of
regulation. For an indication that this attitude is changing, see, e.g., Simon Johnson
and Andrei Shleifer, Coase v. The Coasians : The Regulation and Development of
Securities Markets in Poland and the Czech Republic. (Working Paper, September
1999)
differences in enforcement practice.  In turn, enforcement  may depend more upon the strength of 
the incentives to assert legal remedies than upon the availability of legal remedies, themselves. 
Even this hypothesis, however, oversimplifies, because once one examines closely the differences
among various systems of corporate governance, the assumed homogeneity of even common law
legal systems begins to break down.  Another possibility is that differences in substantive
corporate law are less important than the differences in the level of regulation that different
nations impose on their securities markets.6  Under this latter hypothesis, the focus should be
less on the minority shareholder, and more on the investor generally. The critical question
becomes: Does local law establish adequate disclosure and market transparency standards,
restrict insider trading, and regulate takeovers and corporate control contests adequately?  If it
does, then arguably the exposure of shareholders to unfair self-dealing transactions at the
corporate level may have only a second-level significance. This article finds some evidence in the
Polish and Czech experiences to be consistent with this hypothesis, but also finds other evidence
to suggest that deficiencies in Czech corporate law contributed to the systematic looting of Czech
companies by their controlling shareholders.
Even if the critical protections upon which minority shareholders depend have not yet
been clearly identified,  the available data still strongly support the interpretation that law
matters - -  that in some not yet well understood manner, certain legal systems have encouraged
dispersed ownership, while other systems have rendered it an unstable and transient
phenomenon.  This new emphasis on legal variables has potentially subversive implications for at
least some aspects of neo-classical corporate finance theory.  Much of the modern “law and
6  This possibility was first implicitly noted in Coffee, supra note 4,
and has been explicitly advanced in convincing detail by Katharina Pistor. See
Katharina Pistor, Law As a Determinant for Equity Market Development: The
Experience of Transition Economies (Working Paper 1999).
economics” literature on corporate governance has assumed that financial market regulation was
unnecessary and that the role of corporate law was simply to offer a model form contract to
investors to enable them to economize on contracting costs.  This conclusion that regulation was
superfluous (or worse) rested on twin premises: (1) Sophisticated parties can write financial
contracts that were far more detailed, sophisticated and fine-tuned to their specific circumstances
than any body of standardized regulations could hope to be, 7 and (2) Entrepreneurs had
adequate incentives  to minimize agency costs (in part by bonding themselves and otherwise
limiting their discretion) in order to maximize the value for their stock when they brought their
fledgling firm to the capital markets.8  In short, because, under the standard Jensen and Meckling
model of the firm, entrepreneurs bore the weight of agency costs, they had good reason to
surrender any discretion to expropriate wealth from their investors and to bond themselves to
serve their shareholders faithfully; hence, regulation seemed unnecessary.  From this perspective,
the survival of regulation could best be explained by reference to public choice theories about
interest groups and rent-seeking.9
7 Essentially, the sentence in the text is a very short summary of the
arguments advanced by Judge Easterbrook and Dean Fischel for why much
corporate and securities regulation is unnecessary. See Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991). For an earlier statement of this view, see George Stigler, Public Regulation
of the Securities Market, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
8 See Michael Jensen and William Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305
(1976).
9 For well known such efforts, see Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey
Miller, Toward An Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex.
L. Rev. 469 (1987); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of State of Takeover
This claim that financial contracting largely renders regulation irrelevant cannot explain,
however, the close correlation between a given country’s level of capital market development and
the nature of its legal system.  The more logical conclusion is that law does matter, and regulation
can somehow better promote economic efficiency than can reliance on financial contracting alone.
By themselves, private contracting and the voluntary incentives for disclosure seem incapable of
producing the  level of continuing disclosure necessary to sustain active securities markets.
More importantly, standard economic models of financial contracting within firms do not
fit the privatization context.   Chiefly, this is because privatized firms do not evolve over time
from smaller firms, beginning with the usual incubation period at the venture capital stage and
progressing through the initial public offering, but instead are created Minerva-like by
governmental fiat.  Dispersed ownership is more transient and vulnerable in this context, because
it does not gradually develop over time, but instead arrives overnight at the outset of the firm’s
existence.  Hence, managers do not either contract with shareholders or pledge a reputational
capital that they have carefully built up over years of service; rather, managers and shareholders
are thrown together as legal strangers.10
  This point has important implications for a policy debate that has begun among scholars
Statute, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111 (1987); Jonathan Macey, Administrative Agency
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty,
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 909 (1994) [add other examples].
10 Neo-classical economic theory views the firm as a “nexus of
contracts.”  See Jensen and Meckling, supra note 8. Yet, privatization often
short-circuits this contracting process by simply creating a dispersed shareholder
base.  A stable equilibrium is thus not reached.  The result is that the shareholders
have less well defined legal rights and are more vulnerable to opportunistic actions
by those in control.
who have studied the transitional process: should privatization be “fast” or “slow”?11   Should
policy makers adopt a “Damn-the-torpedoes-full-speed-ahead” approach that accepts the
inevitability of some overreaching by controlling shareholders, but justifies this cost as necessary
to realize and expedite the efficiency gains incident to privatization?  Or, should privatization 
proceed more cautiously because of the risks of market failure and political corruption that may
result when control seekers are tempted to bribe and seduce the judicial and regulatory systems
to achieve the private benefit of control?  These tempting private benefits arise, of course,
precisely to the extent that privatization preceded the creation of an adequate legal foundation. 
The cases examined in this article illustrate this tension and lead this article to favor a prudential
course of phased privatization, which does not make a hasty and potentially corrupting scramble
for control the inevitable consequence of creating a dispersed ownership structure.
This article will proceed through four stages.  Part I will examine some of the difficulties
in attempting to distinguish common law from civil law systems or identifying the critical factors
that lead one to outperform the other.  Part II will then focus on the Czech and Polish
experiences, along with earlier, more tentative efforts at privatization to understand what has
chiefly gone wrong.   Part III will then focus on the techniques recently used for expropriating
value from privatized firms and suggest that these techniques do reveal some deficiencies in civil
law systems.  Finally, Part IV will suggest functional reforms and priorities, but these proposals
11 For examples of this new critique of  “fast” privatization, see John
Nellis, Time to Rethink Privatization in Transitional Economies?, 36 Finance &
Development 16- 19 (International Monetary Fund, June 1999); Bernard Black,
Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate
Governance: What Went Wrong? (Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 178,
September, 1999).
will not give primary emphasis to specific doctrinal rules.  Indeed, their premise will be that
wholesale adoption of U.S. or U.K. legal rules  is not feasible and might not be effective in any
event.
Part I.  Are Common Law Systems Homogenous?
The new comparative research on corporate governance has found that some legal
systems give minority shareholders greater protection from fraud and expropriation than others
and has assumed that the critical differences largely inhere in the statutory law of these rival
systems.  This assumes, however, what is to be proven.  For example, differences in substantive
law could be far less important than differences in enforcement practice.  But, once we focus on 
enforcement practice, a blunt, but overlooked, truth quickly confronts us: common law legal
systems may not be that much alike.  Thus, while it has been an implicit premise of this new
learning that the U.S. and the U.K., as the two leading common law systems and the two leading
economies characterized by dispersed share ownership, are highly similar, this premise is very
debatable.  To be sure, both systems share a common legal history.  But to stop at this point is
to ignore volumes of more recent and highly relevant history over which their two paths have
diverged.  For much of the late 19th  Century Robber Baron era in the United States, controlling
shareholders regularly overreached and plundered minority shareholders and creditors in the
United States.  Colorful rogues- - such as Jay Gould, Jim Fisk and Daniel Drew- - regularly
manipulated the market and invented the technology for “watering” the stock of minority
shareholders.12   Meanwhile, these predators battled for control of railroad empires against even
12 Gould, Fisk and Drew engaged in a famous battle with Commodore
Vanderbilt for control of the Erie Railroad.  When Vanderbilt sought to buy
control by acquiring Erie’s shares in the open market, his three antagonists used
more imperious barons, such as Commodore Vanderbilt, with each side buying and corrupting
local judges.  Much of this era seems to have been recently replayed in Russia and Central
Europe.  Throughout this 19th  Century era, the common law proved a frail reed upon which
minority shareholders could not safely rely.  Over time, investment bankers (most notably, the
House of Morgan) and the New York Stock Exchange brought some semblance of law and order
to this Wild West environment, and legal standards (particularly those applicable to stock issues
and fiduciary standards) were consciously tightened by courts and state legislatures.  Still, as of
1900, little suggested that shareholders in the United States received greater protection than
shareholders in, say, France.  
Another aspect of  this puzzle emerges if we look at the legal system in contemporary
Russia.  Although the Russian legal environment seems even closer to the Hobbesian state of
nature with the looting of corporations and financial institutions being a fairly common event,
Russian corporate law has largely borrowed (in a simplified fashion) the principal features and
protections of U.S. and U.K. corporate law.13   Apparently, expropriation can occur even when
the law “on the books” is nearly optimal.  Perhaps, this should not surprise us, as the legal
realists have taught us for most of the 20th  Century that the “law on the books” is often different
from, and less important than, the “law in practice.”
their control over the Eric board to dump an endless stream of watered stock on
the market.  Both sides bribed judges and state legislators.  See Maury Klein, THE
LIFE OF JAY GOULD at 80-86 (1986). Cf.  Lawrence Friedman, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW at __].
13 Russian company law has borrowed heavily from U.S. and U.K.
sources and, in its current version, was heavily influenced by a model developed
by two American law professors.  See Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, A
Self- Enforcing Model of Company Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996).
One likely answer to this puzzle of when law matters (and why) may lie in the
hypothesis that what really counts is not the content of the substantive law, but the adequacy of
the enforcement mechanisms that underlie it.14   The concept of enforcement mechanism needs,
however, to be understood in a broader sense than simply the availability of specific legal
remedies.  For example, the one characteristic that the Robber Baron era in the United States
shares with contemporary Russia is that in both the central government was weak and largely
unable to enforce its commands in outlying areas.  In the late 19th  Century, the federal
government in the United States was almost powerless to control private business entities;  no
centralized body (such as the SEC) had jurisdiction over investor protection, and business rivals
could establish strong political fiefdoms in one state and largely ignore the commands of judges in
a different state.  In contemporary Russia, the central government appears similarly unable to
control local provincial administrators, who may confiscate or extort assets from corporations
operating in their area of effective control.15
If we focus on enforcement, however, it immediately becomes clear that the differences
14 There is already some empirical support for this modest rephrasing
of the L,L,S & V thesis.  See text and notes infra at 83 to 86.
15 For example, the foreign (and largely institutional) shareholders of
Far Eastern Shipping Company, Russia’s largest commercial shipping line, have
protested that the provincial governor of Vladivostok objected to their large
ownership stake (42%) in Far Eastern and demanded that they surrender 7% of
their shares to him.  Otherwise, he allegedly threatened to reduce their voting
rights by provincial decree.  See Banerjee, “Shareholders Charge Extortion in
Russian Far East,” New York Times, June 16, 1999 at C-3.  For a discussion of
other instances in which regional barons and local political groups have extorted
value from foreign investors in privatized Russian firms, see Merritt Fox and
Michael Heller, 
Lessons From Fiascos In Russian Corporate Governance, (Working Paper Sept.
1999). 
between the U.S. and the U.K.  are probably as great as between the U.S. and France (a nation
generally thought to enforce its investor protection laws only weakly).  In the U.S., class and
derivative actions are permitted, and plaintiff’s attorneys may charge contingent fees, which are
usually awarded by the court based on a percentage of the recovery that the attorney obtains for
the class.  Under the standard “American Rule,” each side bears its own legal fees (which means
that the plaintiff’s attorney faces only the loss of time and expenses invested in the action if the
action is unsuccessful and is not generally liable for the winner’s legal expenses).16   In the U.K.,
the reverse is generally true.  Class actions and contingent fees are not authorized, and the losing
side must normally compensate the winning side for its expenses.  When the individual plaintiff
sues the large corporate defendant,  the latter will likely incur the larger legal fees, and this
disproportion can turn the prospect of fee-shifting under the English rule into a prohibitive
deterrent to litigation.  As a result, while a highly entrepreneurial system of private enforcement
has evolved in the United States that largely overcomes the collective action problems that
dissuade individual investors from suing,17   nothing comparable exists in the United Kingdom.
Another sharp contrast involves the level of judicial activism in the two countries.  For
common law systems to behave similarly, it would logically seem necessary for them to accord a
similar role to the judge.  But it is not clear that they do.  Although the U.S. and the U.K. share a
16 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240,
247 (1975) (“In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled
to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”)
17 This is not to claim that the U.S. system is optimal.  Class actions
could in principle result in over deterrence; conversely, the availability of liability
insurance could nullify the legal threat.  But at least one can understand why such
legal remedies might create socially desirable deterrence. 
common law tradition, judges in these two systems appear to behave quite differently. 
Comparative law scholars rate U.S. courts near the top of the scale in terms of “judicial daring”- -
that is, the willingness of judges to create new legal rules in the absence of legislation- - , but place
the U.K. near the bottom of this same scale.18   In short, the more that one looks at the
supposedly obvious differences between common law and civil law countries, the more that
those differences begin to blur.
On the other hand, the U.K. has other institutions- - most notably its Takeover Panel- -
which appear to be highly effective and which lack any true parallel in the United States.  In
general, takeover defensive tactics are much more restricted in the U.K. than in the U.S.  Finally, 
given the more concentrated character of the British financial community (both in terms of
institutional ownership and physical location in the City of London),  reputational effects may
matter more in the U.K. than in the U.S.  These differences may be important, but they have
little to do with the line between the common law and the civil law.
The point here is not to compare the enforcement mechanisms of the U.S. and the U.K.,
but only to indicate that they may be very different.  In turn, this implies a conceptual problem
with the new academic research that broadly and boldly contrasts common law countries with
civil law countries.   Although real differences are clearly observable in terms of ownership
concentration, the depth of markets, and the value of control, the presumed legal homogeneity of
18 For a survey of comparative law scholars who rated U.S. courts as
second in “judicial daring” (after Israel) and U.K. courts as third from last (out of
fourteen industrialized countries), see Robert Cooter and Tom Ginsburg,
Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 Int’l
Rev. L. & Econ. 295 (1996).  Professors Cooter and Ginsburg suggest that
differences in political structure and the role of dominant political parties best
explain these national differences.
either common law or civil law countries may be more illusory than real.  For example, many of
those substantive legal rules that the U.S. and the U.K. share in common may have only trivial
significance (or may have importance in one legal system and not the other19).  Thus, to return to
a distinction that I have made in earlier work,  formal legal convergence may be less important
than functional convergence.20   Although the U.S. and the U.K. ( and other common law
countries ) have similar legal systems that share a common origin, their common history may be
less important than the fact that they have developed quite different mechanisms for dealing with
the same “agency cost” problems that in the end achieve functionally similar results.  For
example, the issuance of a  materially false financial statement may cause a significant drop in the
company’s stock price upon its discovery in both nations.  In the U.S., it may elicit a class
action; in the U.K., institutional investors may protest to the board and demand corrective action.
However,  in both countries, responsible senior management may lose their jobs over about the
same period.  Similarly, in both countries, a chief executive officer whose company’s stock price
and earnings underperform the industry averages for a given number of successive quarters will
likely find himself out of office- - although the mechanism of his removal (a board coup d’etat or
a hostile takeover) may differ between the two countries.21  
19 Preemptive rights, for example, play in important role in
constraining managements in the U.K., but almost none in the United States.  See
Bernard Black and John Coffee, Hail Brittania: Institutional Investor Behavior
Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997 (1994).
20 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 679-80.
21 Indeed, this is what several empirical studies show about practices
across the leading industrial nations.  See Steven Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards
and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S., 102 J. Pol. Econ.
In short, the danger in focusing on legal commonality is that it may obscure very different
functional mechanisms that are in fact more responsible for the similar ownership structure and
market characteristics of two economies.   Also, the recent research on comparative corporate
governance has largely focused on the firm level, examining specific characteristics of corporate
and bankruptcy law that were thought to generate higher levels of investor protection in
“common law” legal systems.  Although important, this focus slights the importance of 
securities markets themselves.  The one feature that the U.S. and the U.K. clearly share is strong
securities markets, with high disclosure and transparency standards.  Rather than attribute the
strength of these markets to the alleged commonality of U.S. and U.K. corporate law, it may
make more sense to look at the even clearer commonality of U.S. and U.K. securities law.22  
Their similar listing, disclosure, and corporate governance standards may be more important in
producing functional convergence (at least for larger companies) than the legal remedies available
to individual shareholders.  Nonetheless, the indicators used by LaPorta and others23  in their
provocative comparisons of common law and civil law systems have largely focused on the
510 (1994); Steven Kaplan, Top Executive Turnover and Firm Performance in
Germany, 10 J.L. Econ & Org. 142 (1994). [cite other studies].
22 It is noteworthy, for example, that the Securities Act of 1933 was
modeled after the earlier English Companies Act of 1900, which ironically was,
itself, intended to reverse the common law’s tolerance for fraud.  For a discussion
of the different philosophies underlying the Securities Act of 1933 and the
eventual triumph of a disclosure philosophy over a more regulatory philosophy,
see Joel Seligman, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A History
of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance 39-42
(1982).
23 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanos, and Shleifer, supra note 2.
corporate level and ignored the differences in securities market regulation.24   Not only have the
differences among nations in securities regulation been material, but equally important,
international convergence is today proceeding more rapidly at the securities market level than at
the corporate level.25  Indeed, functional convergence among securities markets seems more
attainable than formal legal convergence at the corporate law level, both  because large firms can
migrate between markets and because securities markets, themselves, face global competitive
pressures that may lead them to change and adapt, even when their national governments are
resistant to change.
Recent comparative corporate governance research has clearly been focused on reform.  In
particular, the recent comparative studies seem to have come as a natural progression from the
earlier efforts (and frustrations) of many of these same scholars in attempting to implement
viable corporate governance systems in transitional economies that were just emerging from their
socialist cocoon.  That experience quickly showed two strong tendencies: First, securities
markets are fragile and could collapse, and, second, expropriation by managers and controlling
shareholders could (and did) occur on a massive scale.  The response of some scholars to this
experience has largely been to call for legislative reform to implement the principal features of the
“common law” systems.  Such reform may be desirable,  but calls for legislative reform or formal
legal change often go unheeded.  In a path-dependent world, it may simply be politically
impossible to get from here to there, even when it is clear to most that such a transition would be
24 This point has been earlier emphasized by Pistor. See Pistor, supra note 6.
 
25 See Coffee supra note 4, at 663-676.
efficient (in the Kaldor-Hicks sense) and would yield significant economic growth.
II. Fallacies and Blunders:  A Short History of Mass Privatization
In 1995, the Prague Stock Exchange had 1,716 listings.26   Blessed with relatively low
inflation and nearly full employment, its strong macroeconomic position made it seem the
country in Central or Eastern Europe most likely to make a smooth transition into a
market-oriented economy.   Yet, by early 1999, the number of listings on the Prague Stock
Exchange had fallen by more than 80% to 301, and observers estimated that fewer than a dozen
of these enjoyed any liquidity.27   Correspondingly, over the same period, the value of an
investment in an index of the leading 50 stocks on the Prague Stock Exchange fell by over 60%.28  
Trading dried up, and the viability of the Prague Stock Exchange was itself threatened.  Where
26 See Peter S. Green, “Prague Exchange’s Failed Reform Efforts
Leaves Some Predicting Its Demise,” Int’l Herald Tribune, Mar. 17, 1999 at 16.
27 Id. It must be acknowledged that the Prague Stock Exchange
(“PSE”), itself, delisted many of these companies and imposed higher listing
standards during this period as part of its struggle to survive.  At the outset of
Czech privatization, there were no real listing standards, and the vast majority of
privatized companies were listed. Still, the decision to delist these stocks was not
truly voluntary. Their continued trading on the PSE would likely have left that
market without any credibility. 
 
28 Id.  Specifically, the PX-50 index fell from 1,000 to 371.
there had been 1,486 brokers in 1997, there were only 358 in mid-1999.29    
What happened?  The fundamental fallacy in Czech privatization was that securities
markets would develop spontaneously, simply because voucher privatization would create an
initially dispersed ownership structure.  By widely distributing the stock in privatized
companies to a broad segment of the Czech adult population, Czech planners expected that an
active secondary market would develop naturally.  The militantly laissez-faire attitude of the
initial Czech government also made it highly resistant to any regulation of this market.  
In fact, for an initial period of high optimism, which lasted into 1995, share prices did
rise.  But then, after a series of scandals, the Czech bubble began to burst.  First,  foreign
portfolio investors began to flee the Czech market.  Foreign direct and portfolio investment
dropped from $103 million in 1995 to $57 million in 1996 and then turned negative in 1997.30  
By 1998, the Czech economy entered a general recession.31   In its wake, momentum gathered to
reform the Czech securities market, and  reform legislation was adopted in 1998 that established a
Czech  SEC and curbed some of the more egregious abuses.
Behind this massive disinvestment in the Czech market lay a  pervasive loss of investor
confidence, as small dispersed owners witnessed widespread looting of Czech investment funds
and the systematic exploitation of the remaining  minority shareholders in Czech firms once any
29 Id.
30 See Czech Ministry of Finance, “Current Aspects of the Czech
Capital Market” (internal report dated 1997).
31 Czech GDP contracted by more than 2.5 % in 1998 (whereas
neighboring countries experienced a 4-5 % annual growth). See John Nellis, Time
to Rethink Privatization In Transitional Economies, 36 Finance & Development
16-19 (International Monetary Fund, June 1999).
faction acquired a controlling position.  In consequence, small shareholders systematically
divested their shares and moved savings to other forms of investment.  At the outset of mass
privatization in the Czech Republic, over 7 million Czech citizens purchased shares through
voucher privatization, but by 1999, the number of Czech shareholders had fallen to “barely five
million.”32
If  the Czech experience then seems a paradigm of a market failure caused by inadequacies
in the legal system, it is still important to identify what precisely went wrong.  After a period of
initial optimism, investors clearly lost confidence in the Czech market, causing it to decline
sharply, even though the underlying macro-economic conditions remained  relatively stable on a
regional basis.  Moreover, the apparent Czech failure contrasts sharply with the experience of
neighboring Poland, where the privatization process was slower and where stronger disclosure
and governance standards were established as preconditions.  This section will therefore move
from a brief review of this seeming natural experiment to a more detailed assessment of what
differentiated these two efforts and then a broader look at other privatization programs.
A.  Poland Versus the Czech Republic: Divergent Approaches to Privatization.  In
geopolitical terms, Poland and the Czech Republic share much in common, as similar Central
European countries with a common Slavic culture and a common historical experience as former
members of the Soviet bloc.  But their approaches to privatization could not have been more
divergent.  The Czech Republic rushed into privatization in the early 1990s, with regulatory
32 See Green, supra note 26.
controls being developed on an ex post basis in response to a series of crises and scandals.33  
Determined to move assets into the private sector as quickly as possible, Czech authorities
privatized some 1,491 joint stock companies in the first wave of Czech privatization, and
another 861 in the second wave34- - thereby increasing the private sector share of Czech Gross
Domestic Product from 12% in 1990 to 74% by 1996. In fairness, this was a considerable
logistical achievement.
In contrast, Poland moved far more slowly and equivocally, privatizing only some 500
firms and only pursuant to a procedure that created a state-created investment fund as the
controlling shareholder of each privatized firm. Rather than assuming that a secondary market
would develop spontaneously, Poland designed voucher investment funds as a mechanism to
solve the perceived powerlessness of the individual shareholder in a mass privatization program. 
To assure that these state-created investment funds would control the privatized firms, Poland
neither permitted the creation of private investment funds (which had sprung up overnight in the
Czech Republic) nor initially allowed citizens to invest directly in the stock of the newly
privatized firms.  Rather, Polish law  mandated that citizens could invest their voucher
certificates only in state-created financial intermediaries, known as National Investment Funds
33 I have discussed the contrasting experiences of these two nations at
greater length elsewhere.  See John C. Coffee, Jr. “Inventing a Corporate Monitor
for Transitional Economics: In K. Hopt, H. Kanda, M. Roe, E. Wymeersch and  S.
Prigge, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  The State of the Art
and Emerging Research (1998).                              
34 See Saul Estrin, Domenico Nuti, and Mulica Uvalic, “The Impact
of Privatization Funds on Corporate Governance in Mass Privatization Schemes:
The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia,” in Marko Simoneti, Saul Estrin,
Andreja Bohm (eds.), THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATIZATION FUNDS:
Experiences of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia (1999) at 137, 142.
(or “NIFs”), which were to serve as controlling shareholders of the to-be-privatized firms.35   At
the outset, only fifteen NIFs were chartered, with each being assigned a controlling 33 1/3% stake
in its share of the 500 privatized firms.  The balance of the stock in each firm was held by other
NIFs and by the state.  Each NIF then hired a management company to advise on restructuring
those companies in which the NIF held a controlling stake; in fact, a number of Western
investment banking firms were hired to perform this role, sometimes in preference to Polish
commercial banks.  
In short, viewing continued state ownership as the greater danger, Czech authorities
rushed into privatization and gave relatively little attention to problems of regulation, while in
Poland state planners took the reverse view of the relative dangers, and therefore moved slowly
and cautiously to implement a limited privatization program that effectively substituted state
created monitors (in which citizens could invest) for direct state ownership.
Some results of these two very different approaches were easily predictable: The Czech
Republic quickly developed an active securities market, while the Polish securities market
developed haltingly with only very thin trading (which actually declined between 1994 and
1996).36   In the Czech Republic, private investment funds appeared as a spontaneous, unplanned 
35  For a detailed description of the NIF which essentially resembled
closed- end mutual funds and were created by the Polish Ministry of State
Treasury to hold controlling stakes in privatized firms, see Jannsa Lewandowski
and Roman Szyszko, “The Governance of Privatization Funds in Poland” in
Simoneti, Estrin and Bohm, supra note 34.
36 See Eva Thiel, The Development of Securities Markets in
Transitional Economies: Policy Issues and Country Experiences, 70 Financial
Market Trends 111 (June 1998) (available on LEXIS/NEXIS, news library,
curnws file).
market development, with over 600 funds being formed during the two Czech Privatization
waves.  Necessarily, these funds could only be regulated on an after-the-fact basis.  In contrast, in
Poland, privatization was delayed repeatedly by political infighting over the a variety of issues,
including selection of the management companies that would run the NIFs. 
Both systems encountered serious problems, but of a very different character.  Three
distinct problems compromised Czech privatization, and each was at bottom attributable to legal
failures.  First and most noticeable was the near total lack of transparency in the Czech securities
market.  Because trading was not centralized and trading off the Prague Stock Exchange did not
require contemporaneous price reporting, only the prices of those transactions that the trading
participants wished to disclose (and so transacted on the Exchange) were reported.  In fact, it
appears that the majority of all trading transactions occurred off the Prague Stock Exchange,37
with the minority of transactions that did occur on the exchange being widely thought to have
been at inflated prices.  In effect, current securities prices were revealed only when the traders
wanted to post a price- - either to influence Western portfolio investors or inflate the value of a
privatization fund’s portfolio.  For this and other reasons, including the absence during this
period of any SEC-like authority with power to regulate trading or require contemporaneous
price disclosure, foreign investors quickly grew skeptical that the reported prices on the Prague
Stock Exchange reflected real values.  Moreover, in this non-transparent world, informed
37 According to Thiel, only 3% of actual trades were executed on the
Prague Stock Exchange.  See Thiel, supra note 36.  In part, this was attributable to
the existence of a  a Nasdaq-like alternative system, which also disclosed prices
contemporaneously.  Still, investment funds could trade on a face-to-face basis off
the exchange and use the exchange only for transactions at inflated prices.
predictably flourished because it was more profitable than in an efficient market.38
A second problem quickly arose that further compromised restructuring efforts.  During
the course of the two Czech privatization waves, some 600 investment funds were created, and
they competed vigorously to convince individual investors to convert their privatization
vouchers into their shares.  Potentially,  such vehicles could have become effective corporate
monitors because they aggregated large stakes in Czech corporations and thereby potentially
solved the collective action problem that the dispersed ownership resulting from voucher
privatization necessarily implied.  However, the largest investment funds were established by the
principal Czech commercial and savings banks, which had obvious reputational advantages in
convincing Czech citizens to deposit their vouchers with them.39   Owning only small stakes in
their own investment funds, the banks had little incentive to undertake costly restructuring
activities.  Instead, many sought to use their investment fund’s influence over its portfolio
companies to secure banking clients for themselves.  Rather than concentrating their holdings (and
thus maximizing their influence), most bank-administered funds sought to diversify their holdings
38 Emerging markets appear in general to have very different
characteristics from mature efficient markets.  In particular, stocks in emerging
markets exhibit strong “momentum,” meaning that one period’s performance tends
to predict the next period’s performance; also, high beta stocks do not outperform
low beta stocks.  See K. Geert Rouwenhorst, Local Return Factors and Turnover
in Emerging Markets, 54 J. Fin. 1439 (1999).
39 Of the thirteen largest investment funds in the first wave of Czech
privatization, eleven were created by financial institutions.  See Saul Estrin,
Domenico Nuti, and Mulica Uvalic, The Impact of Privatization Funds On
Corporate Governance in Mass Privatization Schemes in Simoneti, Estrin and
Bohm, supra note 34, 137 at 151.  This was probably predictable, because
citizens were already familiar with the local savings, commercial or postal bank
that sponsored these funds.
in order to hold stakes in as many firms as possible- - in part to solicit banking clients for their
parents.40   Also, to protect their banking parents from potential hostile takeovers, the bank-run
funds invested heavily in the common stock of their banking parent (or in the stock of other
banks).  An incestuous web of cross-ownership quickly developed to insulate the major banks
from hostile takeovers.  Finally, most privatization funds (both bank-related funds and non-bank
funds) found it more profitable to concentrate on trading than on restructuring often inefficient
portfolio companies.  The combination of a non-transparent market and their privileged position
as insiders  made such activities profitable, but constantly filled the media with news of recurring
insider trading scandals.  
If the bank-related funds were passive, the non-bank funds were far worse.  A subsequent
study by the Czech Ministry of Finance found a negative correlation between a privatized firm’s
performance and the percentage of its shares held by non-bank investment funds. 41   In the first
wave of Czech privatization, three percent of the funds became insolvent and were placed into
“forced administration,” 42    but, in the second wave, the rate of insolvency accelerated, and some
40 Other motivations can also explain this failure to concentrate
holdings (which continued in secondary market trading as well as in the original
privatization auctions).  For example, in non-transparent markets, trading in the
stocks of newly privatized firms may be highly profitable for informed traders
with seats on the boards of their portfolio company.
41 See Czech Ministry of Finance, supra note 30.
42 See Jozef Koterba, Evzen Kocenda, and Jan Hanouek, “The
Governance of Privatization Funds in the Czech Republic,” in Marko Simoneti,
Saul Estrin and Andreja Bohm, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATIZATION
FUNDS:   Experiences of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia (1999) at 7,
29-30.
ten funds amounting to over 21% of the market capitalization in that wave were placed in “forced
administration.” 43   The common cause appears not to have been excessive leverage or investment
failures, but “tunneling out” - - the fraudulent siphoning off of assets.
The ease with which funds could be looted is shown by the similar ease with which they
could escape regulation.  Although Czech law did regulate the operation of investment funds, it
did not  restrict the ability of an investment fund to elect to deregister and become an unregulated
holding company.  Symptomatic of the civil law’s literal narrow-mindedness, the difference
between an investment company and a holding company under Czech law was formal, not
functional.  Simply by surrendering one’s license to operate as an investment company, an
investment fund could escape virtually all regulation.  Because share ownership of investment
companies was extremely dispersed, a small control group, holding as little as ten percent of the
voting stock of an investment fund, could usually dominate shareholder meetings and pass a
resolution to convert the fund into a  holding company.  Once unregulated, all forms of
self-dealing were effectively made possible, and the entity might reincorporate outside the Czech
Republic (as some did).  
The extent of such conversions seems extraordinary.  In terms of market share, fully 28%
of the investment privatization funds in the first wave of Czech privatization and 21% of the
funds in the second wave were converted into unregulated holding companies.44   Although this
may sound as if the rate of conversion declined, it must be remembered that an additional 21% of
43 Id.
44 See Jozef Kotrba, Evzen Kocenda, and Jan Hanousek, “The
Governance of Privatization Funds in the Czech Republic,” in Simoneti, Estrin,
and Bohm, supra note 34, at 30.
the funds in the second wave were placed in “forced administration” by the Czech authorities. 45
Hence, nearly half of the funds in the second wave of Czech privatization failed or escaped 
regulation by converting into unregulated entities.  Although major bank-run funds generally
stood apart from this race to convert,  their motives, while non-fraudulent, were rather to use the
funds as a vehicle by which  banking clients and others benefitted.
The eventual upshot of these repeated scandals was that the administration of investment
funds became a contentious political issue in the Czech Republic and helped result in the
downfall of the Vaclav Klaus Government (which had generally opposed market regulation) and
the passage of  reform securities legislation in 1998.  But by then, public confidence in the
securities market had been largely eroded.46   
The Polish experience was in many respects the reverse of the Czech experience. 
Privatization was delayed and delayed again, as demanding disclosure rules and fiduciary
standards for directors were drafted.  Polish citizens were given only one choice: which NIF (of
the 15 originally created) to invest in, as direct investment in either portfolio firms or private
investment funds was not initially permitted.  Trading was centralized on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange, and price transparency appears never to have been a serious issue.  Polish disclosure
standards also won high marks from most observers, and the EBRD Transition Report rated
Poland and Hungary as the two Central European countries that had most closely approximated
45 Id.
46 For a similar assessment that emphasizes the “very visible
exploitation of opportunities for wealth creation by collusion and arbitrage,” see
Theil, supra note 36.
IOSCO standards.47   
Still, while the Polish authorities planned a carefully integrated program of market reforms
and privatization, their success in actually developing their securities market arguably presents a
closer question. Advocates of “fast” privatization might point to the fact that, as of late 1998,
only some 253 companies were listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange 48  (much less than the
number in the considerably smaller Czech Republic).  Indeed, the Polish mass privatization
program was limited to some 500 enterprises, representing only 10% of Polish Gross Domestic
Product.49   Similarly, it remains debatable whether the Polish, state-created financial
intermediaries (the NIFs) have functioned as effective monitors, although some commentators
believe they have at least been more active than the Czech investment funds in attempting to
47 See EBRD Transition Report, Nov. 1998 (available on
LEXIS/NEXIS, news library, curnws file).  The EBRD Transition Report
evaluates the progress of transitional economies toward a free market system in a
variety of different areas (e.g., banking, bankruptcy, and securities market
reforms) using a common index rating system.  In 1998, it awarded Poland a rating
of 3+ (and the Czech Republic a rating of 3) for their efforts at securities market
reform.
48 See PAP News Service, December 28, 1998, “Securities
Commission Head Displeased with 1998.”  (available on LEXIS/NEXIS, news
library, curnws file).
49 See Mario Simonetti, Saul Estrin and Andreja Bohm (eds.), THE
GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATIZATION FUNDS: Experience of the Czech
Republic, Poland and Slovenia (1999) at p. 5; see also EBRD Transition Report,
supra note 44.  In 1997, Polish IPOs issued stock having a value equal to 1% of
GDP.  Id.
encourage efficient restructuring.50
On the other hand, the most impressive evidence in favor of the Polish approach has been
the ability of its securities market to support cash offerings of equity securities. Between 1991
and 1998, no Czech company sold equity for cash as part of its privatization program;
conversely, some fifty Polish companies did.51  Over the same period, no Czech company
effected an initial public offering over the Prague Stock Exchange, while some 136 Polish
companies did on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.52   In short, only the Polish system intentionally
developed its stock exchange so that it could perform the classic role of serving as an engine of
economic growth.
Another strong contrast between the Czech and Polish experiences involves market
performance during conditions of adversity: when the Asian financial crisis struck in 1998,
Poland had a relatively mild experience.  Between the end of 1996 and August 1998, the Polish
stock index fell only 13.1%,53  while the Czech market had already partially collapsed and fell
50 These commentators have argued that only in Poland did the
investment privatization funds acquire sufficiently large stakes to attempt active
management and restructuring.  See Marko Simoneti and Andreja Bohm, “The
Governance of Privatization Funds in Poland” in Simoneti, Estrin, and Bohm,
supra note 34, at 163, 166.
51 See Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, Coase v. The Coasians: The Regulation 
and Development of Securities Markets in Poland and the Czech Republic
(Working Paper, September 1999) at p.26.
52 Id.
53 See Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach and Eric
Friedman, supra note 1, at p. 48.  This paper groups countries by severity of
stock market decline between the end of 1996 and August 1998 and places Poland
in the “relatively moderate” decline category.
further.54  Up until late 1998, the NIFs that had listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange seemed to
be trading at or near their net asset value, while Czech funds during this period often traded at
steep 20% to 70% discounts off their net asset value.55   
Another measure of a securities market’s success is the number and percentage of firms
listed on it that migrate to foreign stock exchanges. Such dual listings may imply that the listed
firm cannot raise capital on its home country exchange; alternatively, it may be a bonding
mechanism by which a firm credibly pledges to comply with disclosure and corporate governance
standards that are not enforced (or enforceable) in its home country.56   In any event, companies
in Central Europe have recently migrated to German stock exchanges (most notably the Berlin
54 The Czech market collapse worsened after the time of the Asian
financial crisis and hit bottom following the 1998 Russian financial crisis. Between
August 1998 and March 1999, the Czech market decline was 30.5%, which far
exceeded the 17.5% decline on the Polish market or the very mild 5.7% decline on
the Hungarian market. See Pistor, supra note 6, at 46. Katharina Pistor also finds
that Czech market capitalization declined 35 % following the 1998 Russian
financial crisis, while Polish market capitalization actually increased 17.8 % over
this same period. See Pistor, supra note 6, at 47. The Prague Stock Exchange has
since recovered, although this may be partly attributable to stock market reforms
enacted largely in 1998.
55 See Simoneti and Bohm, “The Governance of Privatization Funds:
Open Issues   and Policy Recommendations” in Simoneti, Estrin, and Bohm, supra
note 34, at 163,174.  In addition, roughly 25% of the first 500 privatized firms are
now also publicly traded.  This contrast between the steep discounts in the Czech
market and the absence of discounts in the Polish market is, however, subject to
an important qualification: because of the absence of transparency in the Czech
market, reported prices on the Prague Stock Exchange were often inflated, thereby
overstating the discount.
The subsequent history of the NIFs after 1998 is discussed infra in the
text at notes 59 to 61.
56 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 673-76 (discussing foreign listings as a
bonding mechanism).
Stock Exchange). As of early 1999, one study finds that 117 stocks from Eastern Europe were
listed on the Berlin stock Exchange, of which 24 were from the Czech Republic, but only 13 from
considerably larger Poland.57   Prior to the onset of the Russian financial crisis in late 1998,
Poland had 2% of its listed companies traded on German stock exchanges, while the Czech
Republic had 5% (or more than twice as much).58   This disparity should not be surprising.
Having the weaker legal protections, Czech companies had the greater need to list on a foreign
exchange with “stronger” governance standards in order to attract foreign portfolio investors
(most of whom had already fled the Czech market because of its lack of transparency).
  This happy story contrasting the regulated and unregulated worlds encounters one
serious difficulty that arose in late 1998.  Beginning in approximately December1998, the stock
prices of the Polish NIFs fell sharply, and they currently trade at discounts to their net asset
values as steep as ever existed in the Czech Republic.59   Meanwhile, the surviving Czech
investment funds now trade at relatively modest discounts to their net asset value (typically
around 20%).60
57 See Pistor, supra note 6, at 45.
58 Id. at 46.
59 Data showing these discounts as of the Fall of 1999 has been
provided to me by Professor Andrew Weiss, an economist at Boston University.
He informs me that, as of late September, 1999, the average discount on the Polish
NIFs relative to their net asset value had grown to 60%, which was as great or
greater than the standard discount on Czech funds earlier in the decade.
60 Professor Weiss points to the example of the Restitution Fund,
which is the largest Czech fund and which now trades at 1,300 (as of late
September, 1999) and has a net asset value of 1,550 (or less than a 20% discount).
In 1994, it traded for between 500 and 600. Another example is SPIF Cesky,
  What explains this sudden reversal?  Although any answer is speculative, most NIFs
experienced board coup d’etats in 1998 that have replaced their old investment managers. Until
late 1998, the Polish government held the majority of the voting power in NIFs. But since then,
shareholders have replaced the management company in 14 of the original 15 NIFs. In effect, the
same fear of opportunistic control struggles that eroded investor confidence in the Czech market
appears to have devastated the value of Polish NIFs.  No longer the stable pawns of the state,
these NIFs appear  to have suffered a sharp and fairly sudden loss of  investor confidence.
  Still, the number of firms traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange has continued to grow,
and its overall market capitalization now exceeds that of the Prague Exchange.61   Nor has
evidence yet surfaced indicating that privatized companies have been looted or “tunneled” in
Poland. Nonetheless, the bottom line evaluation must be cautious: in transitional economies, it
may take little to disturb investor confidence and produce a flight for the exits.  As they have
been “deregulated” (or, perhaps more accurately, “privatized”), the Polish NIFs may be repeating
the sorry history of the Czech funds.
B.  What Really Distinguishes the Czech and Polish Experiences?  To this point, the
Czech and Polish experiences have been differentiated in terms of the highly spontaneous
character of Czech privatization versus the carefully planned – indeed, constrained – character of
Polish privatization.  But, both nations share one common fact that is troubling for the new
which now trades at 1,346 and was trading at 400 in December, 1994. One
possible reason for this resurgence may have been reform legislation, which  was
adopted in 1998; also,  pursuant to this legislation, many Czech funds converted
to a basically open-end status. Open-end funds do not, of course, have the same
discount as a closed-end fund because their sharers can be redeemed.
61 See Pistor, supra note 6, at 48.
scholarship that emphasizes the importance of differences in substantive corporate law: they
each had a corporation law heavily based on the German civil law structure.  Put simply, their
experiences were very different, but their corporate laws were largely the same.  As a result,
because the corporate laws of Poland and the Czech Republic each provide only weak protection
for minority shareholders,62  their different experiences cannot be used to corroborate the claim
that differences in substantive corporate law are the key causal factors that determine the success
or failure of privatization.
Yet, if Poland and the Czech Republic had similar corporate laws, their approaches to
securities regulation were entirely different.  Not only did Poland impose high disclosure
standards from the outset (including quarterly reporting), it also created an SEC-like agency to
enforce its laws from the beginning of its privatization experience.63  In addition, Poland adopted
provisions that resembled the Section 13(d) of the U.S.’s Williams Act in order to require
ownership transparency - - that is, the disclosure by a potential acquirer of ownership of
specified thresholds of a company’s shares.64   Finally, Poland (but not the Czech Republic)
62 For a closer assessment of the similarities and differences in Czech
and Polish corporate law during the period , see Pistor , supra note 6, at 35-44.
She notes that the Czech Republic did have a considerable lower quorum
requirement (30%), which may have facilitated some frauds , and a higher (and
hence less protective) mandatory bid requirement, but overall she finds that both
countries provided only weak protections in their corporate law for minority
shareholders. 
63 See Pistor, supra note 6, at 37-38.
64 Id.  at 37.  (Noting that Polish law has required ownership
disclosure at the 10% and 25% levels).  Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 requires shareholders of a “reporting company” to disclose to the
issuer and the SEC both their identity, their sources of financing, their plans and
followed the British model of takeover regulation by requiring any shareholder who acquired
more than a specified level of stock to make a mandatory bid for the remaining shares.65   In sum,
as Katharina Pistor has shown, Poland had “weak” corporate law, but “strong” securities law.66   
In overview, these restrictions on the undisclosed acquisition of control and the
mandatory  requirement that a control acquirer offer to purchase the remaining shareholders may
have been responsible for some of the differences in the Czech and Polish experiences.  At the
least, these restrictions helped to stop (or at least slow) the frantic scramble for control that
occurred in the Czech Republic.  Accordingly, the Polish experience may suggest the need for
refinements in the model developed by those scholars of corporate governance who have focused,
somewhat single-mindedly, on differences in substantive corporate law.67   In comparing systems
of corporate governance, many of the most important differences may lie at the level of securities
regulation.  Here, rules prohibiting insider trading, requiring ownership transparency, and
restricting coercive takeover bids may do more to protect minority shareholders from
expropriation than do the same jurisdiction’s substantive corporate law rules.  Indeed, as earlier
suggested, the most important common denominator between the “protective” legal regimes in
intentions, and certain other information when- - either alone or as a part of a
group- - they acquire more than 5% of any class of equity security of such an
issuer.
65 Poland adopted a 33% threshold (originally, it was 50%), while the
Czech Republic introduced this reform (but only at the 50% level) only more
recently. Id. at 37-38.
66 Id. 
67 See sources cited supra at note 2.
the U.S. and the U.K. may be their highly similar securities laws, not their common law origins.
Another hypothesis, however, must also be noted: more important than these legal
differences may have been the creation of the Polish NIFs. By holding controlling stakes, these
state-created financial intermediaries blocked the path of entrepreneurs who have otherwise might
have competed to seize control of newly privatized companies. A critical, if possibly unintended,
role of the NIFs was to provide an assurance to smaller shareholders that they need not fear the
potential expropriation of their investment in a privatized company, at least because of its
vulnerability to a predatory control seeker.68  Indeed, much of the scramble for control in the
Czech Republic seems to have been defensively motivated: each large shareholder essentially
realized that if they did not acquire control, someone else would with resulting injury to them.  In
short, the fear of loss may have provided a greater incentive to compete for control than the
expectation of any synergistic or opportunistic gain.
In this light, the inefficient exposure to loss that the Czech system imposed on minority
shareholders may also explain the earlier noted absence of equity offerings for cash in the Czech
Republic as contrasted with their frequency in Poland.69   Because an offering of equity securities
inherently dilutes large shareholders, it exposes them to an increased risk of exploitation;
68 Lucian Bebchuk has theorized that these competitive struggles for a
controlling position are inevitable whenever the private benefits of control are
large and control is not locked up by special charter provisions. See Bebchuk, A
Rent- Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control, NBER Working
Paper No. 7203 (July 1999). These conditions would seem always to be satisfied
when voucher privatization is used in a transitional economy, because it exposes
control to acquisition and the private benefits of control are necessarily high when
judicial controls are undeveloped. 
69 See text and notes supra at notes 51 to 52.
correspondingly, it also disturbs and potentially upsets any equilibrium that may have been
achieved among large shareholders.  Having acquired a majority position, a controlling shareholder
might prefer to rely on high-cost bank financings than to utilize equity financing where use of the
latter could interfere with its ability to realize the private benefits of control.  But this fear was
not a danger in Poland, where the NIFs gave greater assurance of continuity at least for an interim
period. Thus, one implication of the Czech experience may be that unregulated control contests
and the rapid transition from dispersed to concentrated ownership can give rise to externalities - -
both political and economic.
Correspondingly, the sharp decline in the stock prices of Polish NIFs once shareholders
were permitted to take control of them from the government also reinforces this interpretation
that unregulated control contests expose minority investors to the risk of expropriation and result
in reduced share prices.70   Had the Polish government instead placed some maximum ceiling on
the percentage that any investor (or group of investors) could own in an NIF, this decline might
have been reduced.
C.  Other Privatization Experiences: Do Securities Markets Develop Naturally? 
Although the Czech and Polish experiences probably supply the closest approximation to a
natural experiment that can be found in this area, their experiences are not unique.  A brief  review
of earlier privatization efforts finds similar cases in which emerging securities markets collapsed
after a loss of investor confidence, including in the United States.  Although in the public mind
the term “privatization” first probably came into popular usage with the of the Thatcher
Government in Great Britain in 1979 to sell off government-owned enterprises, important earlier
70 See text and notes supra at notes 59 to 61.
instances can be identified.  The first large-scale privatization offering to public investors seems
to have occurred in 1961, when the Konrad Adenauer government in the Federal Republic of
Germany sold a majority stake in Volkswagen in a public offering that was aimed at small
investors in Germany.71   This was followed by an even larger offering in 1965 of the
government-owned shares of VEBA A.G., a German heavy mining company.  Both offerings
were initially successful, but share prices fell dramatically thereafter, forcing the Adenauer
government to develop “a rescue operation... aimed at protecting small shareholders.”72   The
experience appears to have dissuaded both Germany and other European governments from
embarking on similar programs until the Thatcher Administration initiated its
ideologically-motivated wave of privatizations in 1979.
During the early 1970's, the Pinochet government in Chile sought to reprivatize industries
that had earlier been nationalized by the Allende government.  Sales were made at extremely
discounted prices, and, when the Chilean economy later entered a debt and payment crisis in the
early 1980's, it renationalized many of these same industries.  Not until the late 1980's (at
roughly the same time as the Thatcher government) did Chile effect a more successful
privatization program through the public sale of shares in state-owned enterprises.73   However,
71 For a fuller description of these offerings, see William Megginson,
Robert Nash, & Matthias van Randenburgh, The Financial and Operating
Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis, 49
J. Fin.  403 (1994). An arguably controlling stake in Volkswagen continues to be
held by a one German state (Lower Saxony).
72 Id. at 407.
73 See Pan Yotopoulos, The (Rip) Tide of Privatization: Lessons
from Chile, 17 World Development 683 (1989).
the key event in this later, successful privatization was the 1990 privatization of Telefonos de
Chile, which was largely targeted at U.S. investors through ADRs.  Mexico’s very large and
successful privatization program in the 1990s has similarly been effected through privatizations
of large state-owned companies that were directly listed on the New York Stock Exchange.74   
Mass privatization efforts that have not been implemented through established exchanges
have fared less well.  The most notable example is, of course, Russia.  By virtually all accounts,
Russian privatization has been a spectacular failure, and most recent discussion of privatization
have been largely preoccupied with the Russian experience.75    But the lessons from the Russian
failure are more difficult to draw because the Russian privatization effort was flawed from the
outset by critical design failures and macro-economic conditions that were not present in either
Poland or the Czech Republic. First, Russian privatization was significantly different from Czech
privatization in that substantial blocks of stock were allocated to the incumbent managers as a
political accommodation that was essential to the implementation of privatization.  The result
was probably easily predicted: within 2-3 years after mass privatization, most minority
shareholders had sold their shares to the insiders, thereby producing the same highly concentrated
74 For an overview of Mexican privatization, see Rafael LaPorta and
Florence Lopez-de-Silanos, Benefits of Privatization- - Evidence from Mexico,
Private Sector, at 21-24 (World Bank June 1997).
75 For recent detailed accounts, see Fox and Heller, supra note 15, and Bernard
Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and
Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? (Stanford Law School Working 
Paper No. 178, September 1999).
ownership structures that are the norm elsewhere.76  Second, in contrast to other recent
privatization experiences, the Russian government lacked control over its outlying regions.  In
these regions, privatized companies have been more subject to expropriation by the local
government (or coalitions led by, or affiliated with, it) than by controlling shareholders.77  Third,
the legal system in Russia was almost uniquely primitive, indeed to the point that few
contractual obligations could be routinely enforced, and resort to extra-legal means (most notably,
violence) was the norm, not the exception.  Finally, the macro-economic condition in  Russia
proved to be particularly perverse.78    As a result, in 1998, the Russian government defaulted on
its domestic and international debt, and the RTS stock market index fell almost 90% from its level
eleven months earlier.79   When an experiment fails from multiple causes, it is difficult to attribute
primary responsibility to any one cause.
In contrast, what makes the Czech story more interesting than the Russian story is that
the same transition from dispersed to concentrated ownership occurred even without the built-in
bias for insider ownership or the poor macro-economic conditions that characterized the Russian
context. Nor is the Czech experience unique. To the extent that Czech privatization became
76 See Joseph Blasi and Andrei Shleifer “Corporate Governance in
Russia: An Initial Look” in Roman Frydman et. al. (eds.), CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA (Central European
University Press 1996).
77 See text and notes supra at note 15.
78 See Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova, supra note 75.
79 William Megginson and Jeffrey Netter, From State to Market: A
Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, NYSE Working Paper 98-05 (Dec.
1998) at p.16.
stalled, the lack of regulation would appear to play a greater causal role, because other
explanations are simply not as available.  More generally, except when companies have been
privatized through offerings listed on international stock exchanges, the Czech progression to
concentered ownership seems to be the dominant pattern, with the exceptions being  few in
number.  Poland appears to be the most notable exception, but its story has not yet played out
fully. As next discussed, this pattern raises the question of whether this transition is an inevitable
progression.
D.  The Re-appearance of Concentrated Ownership.  Both in Russia and in the Czech
Republic, mass privatization through the sale or distribution of privatization vouchers to the
citizenry inevitably created a highly dispersed ownership structure- - but only for a transitory
period.  Over time, concentrated ownership has re-emerged.  Because numerous studies have
concluded that privatized firms become more efficient,80  it is not surprising that some studies
attribute this increased efficiency to the emergence of concentrated ownership.  For example, one
detailed study that examined the performance of a sample of 706 Czech firms that were
privatized in 1991-92 over the period from 1992 to 1995 concluded that the greater the
80 See e.g., Juliet D’Souza and William Megginson, The Financial and
Operating Performance of Privatized Firms During the 1990s, 54 J. Fin. 1397
(1999) (finding significance increases in profitability and efficiency); Nicholas
Barberis, Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Natalia Tsukanova, How Does
Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops, 104 J. Pol. Econ. 764
(1996) (study of 452 retail stores); Roman Frydman, Marek Hessel, and Andrej
Rapaczynski, Why Ownership Matters?: Politicization and Entrepreneurship in
the Restructuring of Enterprises in Central Europe (C.V. Starr Center Working
Paper No. 98-14 April 1998) (summarizing other studies); Megginson and Netter,
supra note 79.
ownership concentration, the greater the improvement in profitability and market valuation.81  
Unfortunately, this study examined a period that ended in 1995, prior to the subsequent free fall
in price levels on the Prague Stock Exchange.  Possibly, the higher stock market valuations that
they found were a transitory phenomenon as control groups were forming and controlling blocks
were being assembled.
Still, let us assume, for a moment, that newly privatized firms with concentrated
ownership do initially outperform comparable firms with dispersed ownership.  Does this imply
that an economy characterized by concentrated ownership will be more efficient than one
characterized by dispersed ownership- - at least in the case of transitional economies?  The
problem with any such conclusion is that the benefits from concentrated ownership may prove
to be short-lived, while the costs surface only at a delayed point.  Even if concentrated
ownership implies superior monitoring of management, these benefits have to be balanced against
the enhanced risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders.  Such expropriation risks the
phenomenon of securities market collapse, which in turn may result in a variety of social costs.
For example, as earlier noted, Polish securities markets have been able to support IPOs and other
cash offerings of equity securities, while Czech markets have not.82   Economic growth then may
be at risk.
 The extent of this risk has only recently begun to emerge in new research that documents
an apparent global pattern.  The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 adversely affected economic
81 Stign Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Pohl, Ownership and
Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Czech Republic (World Bank Policy
Research Paper No. 1737 1997).
82 See text and notes supra at notes 51 to 52.
development in most emerging markets, but to varying degrees.  Although most analysts have
assumed that its causes lay in macroeconomic and banking policies, one provocative new study
concludes that “the weakness of legal institutions for corporate governance had an important
effect on the extent of [exchange rate] depreciations and stock market declines in the Asian
crisis.”83   
Essentially, this study argues that the rate of expropriation increases when the rate of
return on investment falls.  In short, managers and controlling shareholders tend to steal more in
bad times than in good times- - and investors expect this.  Hence, given any adverse shock to the
financial system of a region (or the world generally), the relative decline will be worst in those
countries with legal systems that confer the weakest protections on minority shareholders. 
Using as its sample the 25 emerging markets that are currently open to significant capital flows
(and hence the most vulnerable to speculative attack), this study concluded that “weak
enforcement of shareholder and creditor rights had first-order importance in determining the
extent of exchange rate depreciation in 1997-1998.”84   Indeed, three indices of legal institutions- -
which it termed “efficiency of the judiciary, corruption, and the rule of law”- - were found to
better “predict the changes in exchange rates in emerging markets better than do the standard
macro measures.”85   Other measures reflecting the strength of shareholder rights were also found
to be significantly correlated with the severity of the financial crisis, but only “as long as these
83 Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach and Eric Friedman,
Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 1997-1998 (Working
Papers,1999) at p.3.
84 Id. at 4.
85 Id. at 6.
measures reflect how rights are actually enforced.”86   To sum up, the strength of legal protections
(as measured by actual enforcement practice) appeared to be the independent variable that best
predicted the dependent variable of severity of financial crisis.
At this juncture, it is useful to return to the Czech experience.  As noted earlier, a number
of studies have found that privatized firms became more profitable to the extent that their
ownership was more concentrated.87   But is this advantage sustainable over time?  The
subsequent sharp decline in stock prices on the Prague Stock Exchange suggests that some
financial shock (from whatever source) destabilized the economy and produced a sudden
withdrawal of investor capital.  Why was the market decline so extreme in the absence of any
major macro-economic change in the Czech economy?  Perhaps investors were aware of their
potential vulnerability, but expected that managers would constrain their rate of expropriation
during “boom” times.  At the first sign of “bust,” however, investors race for the exits because
they expect the rate of expropriation to increase.
Whether or not one accepts this premise that the rate of expropriation rises with any
decline in return on investment, the critical factor in this scenario is that investor loss of
confidence will be greatest in those economies where they believe they are least protected legally.
In truth, assumptions about the relationship of the rate of expropriation to the return on
investment are probably unnecessary to drive this model.  All that one need hypothesize is that
investors will ignore legal risks and their vulnerability to expropriation by controlling
shareholders during “boom” times, possibly on the premise that managers and controlling
86 Id.
87 See text and notes supra at notes 80 to 81.
shareholders will not risk disrupting the momentum that is benefitting them all.  Essentially, the
Czech experience seems consistent with this pattern.  
Although such data can be read to mean that legal development has a decisive influence on
the viability of securities markets, the true independent variable in such a model may be investor
confidence, and the level of such confidence may be influenced by factors other than the strength
of legal protections.  Investors may learn that a particular venue (whether a country or a stock
exchange) has frequently experienced scandals- - and decide to avoid it.  Even within the United
States, there is evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  In 1992, the Amex launched the
Emerging Company Marketplace (“ECM”) to trade the stocks of small, high growth
companies.88   By 1995, it was forced to close this market after a series of scandals had “damaged
the ECM’s reputation for monitoring the quality of its listings...”89   Yet, investors in the ECM
had the same legal rights as investors trading on the NYSE.  Although other factors also inhibited
the growth of the ECM,90  the role of scandal seems critical.  Investors are neither legal scholars
nor comparativists; they learn principally from experience, not theory.  Moreover, they may
expect any apparent pattern that they observe to continue (even if it was in fact simply an
unconnected series of random events).  Hence, scandal predicts future scandals, and investors
expect more expropriation.  This expectation of continuity  may explain the relatively high failure
88 For a detailed discussion of the ECM, see Reena Aggarwal and
James Angel, The Rise and Fall of the Amex Emerging Company Marketplace, 52
J. Fin. Econ. 257 (1999).
89 Id. at 283.
90 Aggarwal and Angel in fact give greater weight in their account to
an adverse selection problem: “good” firms matured from the ECM to the Amex,
while “bad” firms remained behind. Id. at       .
rate of “emerging company” or “incubator” stock exchanges.91
The bottom line then may be that anything that invites public scandal (including weak
legal protections) creates a negative externality.  If so, public policies intended to protect market
integrity and preserve investor confidence can be easily justified, even if they may sometimes
impede the ability of small and non-fraudulent firms to raise capital.
III.  The Technology of Expropriation
Although a variety of tactics were used to expropriate wealth from Czech companies and
investment funds, the best known strategy was popularly referred to as “tunneling.”  Essentially,
this practice involved the sale or transfer of a controlled firm’s products or assets at below
market prices to another company, which was controlled by the same controlling group as
controlled the original firm.  Gradually, through a series of transactions that might involve a
number of such shell companies, the controlled corporation’s assets could be hollowed out
(hence, the term “tunneling”); alternatively, its expected future cash flow could be transferred to
the shell company by causing the controlled firm to enter into long-term production contracts
under which most of its output was effectively sold at cost (or less) to one or more shell
companies.
Variations on this basic pattern were numerous. For example, an entrepreneur might
borrow funds to buy a controlling stake in a Czech company, using a personally owned
91 Aggrarwal and Angel observe that: “During the 1980s, virtually
every stock market in Europe established a special section for companies that
were too small to meet the normal listing requirements... .   Many of these markets
appeared to prosper for a short time, but ultimately they all suffered from severe
illiquidity and attracted few companies or investors.”  Id. at 281.  Amsterdam
closed its Official Parallel Market in 1993, and London closed its Unlisted
Securities Market in 1996.  Id.
corporation as the vehicle that borrowed the acquisition debt from a bank. Then, once control of
the firm was acquired, the entrepreneur could merge his personally controlled firm into the
privatized firm, in order to make the latter liable for his personal acquisition indebtedness.92
Such unfair self-dealing is not particularly novel or imaginative.  But,  precisely for that
reason, the fact that it worked so effectively in the Czech Republic suggests there must be some
characteristic weakness or vulnerability in Czech law and (because Czech corporate law was
largely patterned after German law) in the civil law generally.  A key reason why “tunneling” was
successful involved the availability of legal techniques by which it could be insulated from judicial
scrutiny.  A 1997 study by the Czech Ministry of Finance examined a variety of tactics for
looting privatized companies and reported that:
‘tunneling’ into companies is a frequent phenomenon.    Current ‘corporate
raiders’ have discovered a risk-free method of removing money from companies. 
This method consists of holding a general meeting of shareholders in which the 
‘raiders’ have a voting majority; this meeting passes a decision on a transaction
involving corporate property. . . and the Board of Directors of the company then
carries out this operation, with consequent damage to the company.  No
(minority) shareholder can blame the Board of Directors of the company for this
operation as it is bound by the decision of the general meeting.  93
In short, if the self-dealing transaction were approved by a majority of the shareholders, the
directors were effectively insulated from legal liability.  Although minority shareholders could sue
to challenge action taken at the shareholders’ meeting, they would receive little disclosure about
the terms of the transaction and hence were not in a position to raise an effective challenge.
   To the extent this assessment is accurate, it reveals a sharp contrast between the
92 For these and other examples, see Coffee, supra note 33, at 113-114.
93 See Czech Ministry of Finance “Current Aspects of the Czech
Capital Market” (memorandum dated 1997).
constraints of Czech and those of common law jurisdictions.  For example, although U.S. law
gives considerable weight to shareholder ratification, U.S. law generally does not  permit a
self-interested shareholder to ratify a transaction between the corporation and itself (or an
affiliate). 94   Typically, only the vote of a disinterested  majority of the shareholders can have
this impact.  Thus, the practical consequence of this difference is to accord the majority
shareholder (or shareholder group) far greater power to impose self-dealing transactions on the
minority and hence to create a far stronger incentive for a shareholder or group seeking control to
obtain a majority interest. Although German corporate law (and hence Czech law as a legal
system substantially based on that model) permits the shareholder to attack the results of a
shareholder meeting, this is a uphill battle, because it asks the court to overrule the majority of
the shareholders, not simply the board of directors.
Majority ratification was not, however, the only technique by which “tunneling” could be
effected.  Well before achieving an absolute majority, a shareholder or a shareholder group might
achieve de facto control of the board and thus be in a position to approve the same self-dealing
transactions without shareholder ratification, based rather on board approval.  Directors who
approved a clearly unfair self-dealing transactions might face some risk of legal liability, but this
risk is mitigated by two key factors that characterize many civil law systems.  First, shareholders
will not necessarily learn of the self-dealing transaction.  Under the German corporate law, an
94 Some U.S. statutes specifically sterilize the votes of interested
shareholders in establishing the procedures by which a conflict of interest
transaction may be approved by the board or shareholders so as to overcome the
presumption against fiduciary self-dealing.  See California Gen. Corp. Law  § 310
(1976).  Others, including Delaware, have reached a similar result by judicial
decision.  See Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (shareholders
approval merely removes “cloud” and does not sanction unfairness).
elaborate body of law regulates the relationship between the companies that belong to a holding
structure, or “Konzern.” This body of law permits a majority shareholder to dominate its
subsidiary, but expects the majority to compensate the minority for any detriment that they
suffer.95   Although the firm’s auditors must report on such intercompany dealings, they report
only to the controlled firm’s supervisory board, not to its minority shareholders. German
commentators have candidly acknowledged that this non-transparent approach to the regulation
of self-dealing leaves at least a potential loophole in the civil law’s system of corporate
governance: shareholders cannot challenge transactions of which they are unaware.96
More generally, German corporate law views the shareholders’ meeting as the
appropriate forum at which different issues are to be debated and resolved. This may work
adequately in a system of concentrated ownership, where large shareholders can be expected to
attend the meetings. But privatization inherently creates dispersed shareholders with small
stakes, and they are less likely to attend such a meeting. In addition, management can schedule
the meeting at remote sites on little notice, which tactic will work to discourage at least small
shareholders. Moreover, Czech law exacerbated this problem by establishing a particularly  low
quorum requirement (30%) that effectively permitted as few as two large funds to satisfy this
95 For a brief overview, relating the application of this law to
transitional economies, see Pistor, supra note 6, at 17-18.
96 See, e.g., Herbert Wiedemann, “The German Experience with the
Law of Affiliated Enterprises,” in Klaus Hopt (ed.), GROUPS OF COMPANIES
IN EUROPEAN LAW:  Legal and Economic Analysis on Multinational
Enterprises (1982); Ulrich Immenga, “The Law of Groups in the Federal Republic
of Germany,” in Eddy Wymeersch (ed.), GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN THE
EEC (1993) at 85.
requirement and vote through action at a hastily convened meeting.97
In transitional economies, these dangers are further aggravated by the greater likelihood
that the supervisory board may not be independent or may simply be too inexperienced or
passive to evaluate the transaction’s fairness. Second, the judicial systems in transitional
economies have not been able to develop remedies or standards on their own to reduce the risk of
expropriation.  Third, even if shareholders do learn of the transaction, they may lack the incentive
to take action or sue.  Here, the standard collective action problem surfaces: small shareholders
will seldom have sufficient economic reason to undertake costly litigation.  In addition, once a
control block is formed, it is rare to find any other substantial shareholder group;98   instead, other
potential competitors for control typically exit quickly once de facto control has been achieved
by a rival. Thus, few individual shareholders will face a sufficiently substantial loss to justify the
cost of litigation on an individual basis.  In the U.S., this collective action problem is at least
partially solved by (1)  the existence of the contingent fee agreement (which is essentially a
risk-shifting device by which the small shareholder transfers the risks of the litigation to an
entrepreneurial plaintiff’s attorney),  and (2) the legal rule that a successful plaintiff in a
derivative action is entitled to have the corporation pay its reasonable attorney’s fees.  Absent
similar enforcement mechanisms, minority shareholders will predictably remain passive, even if
they learn that they have been defrauded. 
97 See Pistor, supra note 6, at 35-44. These techniques were in fact
used in practice by one notorious Czech entrepreneur; see also Charles Wallace
“The Pirates of Prague,” Fortune, December 23, 1996 at 78 (discussing career of
Victor Kozeny); See also, Coffee, supra note 33, at 115.
98 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, supra note 2, at 505 (in 75% of
cases, no other large shareholder exists when there is a controlling shareholder). 
IV.  Policy Lessons from the Privatization Experience
Several common denominators are discernible in the early efforts to privatize state-owned
enterprises and to develop securities markets in transitional economies.  First, most recent
studies of the privatization process have reported that the most obvious corporate monitors
(namely institutional investors and, in particular, privatization investment funds) have shown
little interest in monitoring.  Either they have been clearly ill-equipped for such a role, or, more
typically,  they have used their “insider” positions to engage in informed trading in thin and
non-transparent markets or  to pursue other self-interested ends.  While the circumstances vary,
the underlying cause seems the same: restructuring is a costly undertaking in which the gains are
necessarily shared with other shareholders.  In contrast, so long as markets are non-transparent
and minority protections largely non-existent, it may be easier and more profitable to expropriate
wealth than to create it.  Second, to the extent that large shareholders are active, their primary
focus seems to be on obtaining a controlling position- - either to exploit the private benefits of
control or as a defensive measure to protect themselves from expropriation, or both. Once this
scramble for control produces a victor, “tunneling” begins.   Third, emerging securities markets
seem vulnerable to sudden collapses.  Once a market becomes stigmatized, the decline is fast, not
slow, as a sudden exogenous shock can cause both foreign and domestic investors to race for the
exits- - if they lose confidence.
To remedy these problems, some have called for the wholesale reform of corporate and
securities laws in order to introduce the more protective features of Anglo-American law into the
typically civil law codes of most transitional countries.  This sounds desirable, but closer
analysis reveals a problem in this approach: little consensus exists as to precisely what are the
most important and protective features of Anglo-American law.  For example, preemptive rights
play an important role in the U.K., but virtually no role in the U.S.  In contrast, class actions
may generate a desirable level of deterrence in the U.S., but are unknown in the U.K.  Although
research seems to show that common law systems outperform civil law systems in protecting
minority shareholders, a satisfactory explanation for the common law’s apparent superiority
remains elusive.  Other commentators have stressed that the development of strong securities
markets requires high disclosure standards and protection for minority shareholders from
expropriation (both of information and property) by insiders.99   This seems clearly valid, but it
still leaves open the considerable problems of how to get to such an ideal state from the existing
starting points.
In overview, possible reforms can be grouped under three headings: (1) judicial reforms
(which respond either to the underdeveloped state of the judiciary in transitional economies or to
special problems relating to the alleged rigidity of the civil law); (2) structural reforms (which
may require legislation but do not involve legal rules), and (3) legislative reforms (which might
relate to either substantive corporate law or securities regulation). This section will begin with
judicial reforms because it seems necessary to assess frankly what can and cannot be expected of
the judiciary in developing countries. Thereafter, it will consider both structural reforms and
possible legislative revisions.
A. Judicial Reforms. Although it is conclusory to simply assume that common law
systems necessarily offer greater protection to minority shareholders than do civil law systems,
99 See Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Stock Markets: The Nontriviality of Securities Law, (Working Paper, July
1999).
the evidence is strong that dispersed ownership persists primarily in common law legal
regimes.100  Potentially, this could be the result of statutory provisions that are generally found
in common law systems, but to date proponents of the common law’s superiority have not been
able to provide a convincing explanation of the critical statutory deficiencies of the civil law or
the common law’s features that better protect minority shareholders. Alternative hypotheses
need therefore to be considered. 
1. A Hypothesis of the Common Law’s Advantages.  One plausible hypothesis is that 
the real superiority of common law systems lies in the distinctive role of the common law judge. 
A considerable “law and economics” literature views the corporate charter as a highly incomplete
contract.101  Necessarily, there are gaps in this contract that must be filled in .  “Law and
economics” theorists have disagreed over the years as to what principle or formula the court
should use in seeking to fill these gaps,102 but consensus exists that the common law judge can
and should fill these gaps.  In contrast, the civil law judge may not have the same authority or the
100 Japan is the marginal case, because it has dispersed ownership
(along with a unique control structure).  It is primarily a civil law country, but
with American securities laws having been imposed in the aftermath of World War
II.  This pattern may suggest that securities laws are more important than
common law remedies, or it may just be that Japan has developed unique
institutions by which to preserve investor confidence.
101 For standard statements of this perspective, see Frank Easterbrook
& Daniel Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991) at 1-39; see also Jonathan Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate
Governance: A Contractual Perspective, 18 J. Corp. L. 185 (1993).
102 Compare Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87
(1989) (recommending “information forcing” rule) with Easterbrook and Fischel,
supra note 101 (preferring wealth maximizing rule).
same expansive understanding of the judicial role.  To the extent that the civil law distrusts
judicial activism or views it as a  usurpation of the legislature’s role, the civil law judge is
confined to the narrower role of interpreting what comprehensive civil codes have actually
specified.  Thus, at least at the margin, the common law encourages gap filling, while the civil law
tends to impede it.
Any summary description of the differences between the civil law and the common law
will necessarily omit much and risks stereotyping legal systems that have considerable subtlety
and variation.  Nonetheless, the role of the judge does appear significantly different under the two
systems.103  If it overstates to say that the civil law judge is simply a bureaucrat whose job it is
to interpret and apply a written body of statutes, it is still true that the civil law jurist lacks the
same freedom and discretion as the common law judge to search through a vast storehouse of legal
precedents to find the rule best suited for the case before the court.104  By definition, the
inventory of potentially applicable precedents that the common law creates confers greater
discretion upon the legal decision-maker.
This distinction has even greater force in the area of private law.  On the one hand, civil
law codes tend to be especially comprehensive in this area and thus arguably leave less room for
gap-filling.  Conversely, the common law (and particularly corporate law) does not view statutes
as the only (or even principal) source of law.  Under the common law, legal duties can arise that
103 See, e.g., R. David and J. Brierley, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
THE WORLD TODAY (ad ed. 1978) at 339.
104 See M. Damaska, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE
AUTHORITY (1986) (emphasizing technocratic role of common law judge); see
also, M. Shapiro, COURTS: A Comparative and Political Analysis (1981).
are independent of any statutory source.  The most important example for corporate law is the
concept of fiduciary duty.  Fiduciary duties can develop out of a course of dealing or a
relationship involving trust and confidence where neither side has contractually assumed any
duty to the other.105  In corporate law, the best example of how the concept of fiduciary duty
invites common law judges to fill gaps involves the duty of loyalty.  Although some American
states do define the duty of care by statute, the broader duty of loyalty is generally left to the
common law process of judicial interpretation.  There, it  rests on a common law foundation
consisting of several centuries of judicial precedent.  Even before the modern corporation arose,
the law of agency and the law of trusts held the servant accountable to the master for secret
profits obtained from use of the master’s property.  These decisions were later applied to hold
corporate officials- - including officers, directors, and controlling shareholders- - to similar
standards.  In Delaware, the foundational decision defining the contours of this duty is Guth v.
Loft, 106 which in broad and somewhat rhetorical prose instructs corporate fiduciaries that they
are held to an “uncompromising duty of loyalty.”107  Equally famous decisions in New York and
elsewhere have used similarly broad language, including, of course, Justice [then Judge] Cardozo’s
famous phrase that a fiduciary must observe not merely the “morals of the marketplace, but the
105 The law of insider trading has shown how complex this issue can
be of when a fiduciary duty arises, but the key criteria are (1) the possession of
discretion to act for the beneficiary by the party to be charged with the duty, and
(2) dependence by the beneficiary. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F. 2d
551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
106 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
107 Id. at 510-511.
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”108  Sophisticated judges recognize today that such
broad norms must be applied in a context-specific fashion, and this may lead them to
de-emphasize the rhetorical flourishes of an earlier generation and instead consider the
hypothetical bargain into which shareholders and corporate fiduciaries have entered.  But
attempts to “contract out” from the duty of loyalty through broad exculpatory charter
provisions have generally failed.109
The immediately relevant point is that the common law’s concept of fiduciary duty both
enables and instructs the common law judge to fill in the gaps in an incomplete contract.  Indeed,
the fiduciary concept both tells the court that implied and non-cancellable conditions must be
read into the corporate contract and provides a rich repository of illustrations in the form of
cases to guide the court.  No similar deep inventory of legal precedents existing apart from the
statutory law of the corporations code arms the civil law judge.  To be sure, some modest steps
towards recognizing a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders have been taken in some civil law
jurisdictions (most notably, Germany),110 but the concept has been stated only in the abstract
108 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(1928).
109 See, e.g., Irwin v. West End Dev. Co. , 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D.
Colo. 1972) (“Exculpatory provisions of corporate articles create no license to
steal.”), modified on other grounds, 481 F. 2d 34 (10th  Cir. 1973).
110 The German Federal Supreme Court recognized that controlling
shareholders owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to minority shareholders in the much
discussed “Linotype Case” in early 1988.  See 103 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 184 (1988).  See
generally, Hwa-Jin Kim, Markets, Financial Institutions, and Corporate
Perspectives from Germany, 26 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 371, 392-394 (1995).  In
addition, Germany has a separate body of law called “Konzern law” which is
and lacks any effective enforcement mechanism.  As a result, although the differences between
the civil law and the common law can easily be overstated, the civil law essentially views the
corporations code as the law and confines the judge to, more or less, mechanically applying it,
while for the common law judge, corporate law is a complex amalgam of statutes and judicial
decisions.  Rather than replacing or superceding earlier judicial precedents, the statutory
corporations code can be seen as attempting to codify those precedents.  
This hypothesis that the common law tends to encourage gap-filling, while the civil law
discourages it, certainly remains open to challenge.  Some empirical evidence finds British judges,
for example, to be less “daring” than their civil law counterparts in France or Germany.111  But
whatever the overall level of caution of British judges, the context of corporate law may be
distinctive.  There, the concept of fiduciary duty- - with its clear statement that there exists a
legal duty, independent of statute or contract, to be fair to minority shareholders- - invites and
prods courts to fill in apparent gaps in the corporate contract.
Still, even if the common law does better arm the judge to resist opportunism, what
relevance does this contrast have for transitional economies?  That is, even if common law judges
intended to protect both minority shareholders in, and creditors of, companies
that belong to a group of companies.  See generally, J. Bantz Bonano, The
Protection of Minority Shareholders in a Konzern Under German and United
States Law, 18 Harv. Int’l L.J. 151 (1977).  See also Ulrich Immenga, “The Law of
Groups in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Eddy Wymeersch (ed.),
GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN THE EEC (1993) at 85.
Whatever the situation in Germany, far fewer rights (or remedies) seem to
be recognized elsewhere on the Continent that can be exercised by minority
shareholder. See Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: One
American’s Perspective, 1998 Colum.. Bus. L. Rev. 121 (1998).
111 See Cooter and Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 300-301.
have greater discretion and can fashion novel remedies, it does not follow that their style of
judicial behavior can be imposed on civil law judiciaries.  It is simply not a feasible reform to
attempt to convert civil law judges into common law judges (it would be easier to convert
financial economists into law professors, or vice versa).  But such pervasive reform is not needed,
because only a small portion of the workload of most judges in either system will deal with
corporate or securities law matters.  The simpler course may be simply to transfer this portion of
their caseload to a specialized tribunal, as next discussed.
2.  Specialized Courts.  The inflexibility of civil law courts has already led to the creation
of specialized courts in some civil law countries, which specialized courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over some subject matters.112  One example is the German experience with labor law
courts, which were created because labor law inherently requires a difficult style of
decision-making.113  Indeed, even common law countries have made substantial use of specialized
tribunals to hear securities law disputes.  For example, the federal securities laws now also
contemplate their enforcement before administrative law judges.
Thus, a practical approach to effective enforcement may lie in creating a cadre of
112 Russia has experimented with an “economic court” system, but
with mixed results at best.  See Karen Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes in
Russia’s Market Economy, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 59 (1996).  In contrast to an
independent economic court, the proposal here made is for a specialized court that
is located within the agency in whose law the court is to specialize.
113 German labor courts date back to the Weimar Republic and were
designed “to force labor-management disputes into a procedural framework similar
to the political process of party competition and parliamentary decision making.” 
See Blankenburg, Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands Compared to
Neighboring Germany, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 1,26 (1998).  The German labor courts
now have ten divisions at the federal level and twenty-seven judges at this level
alone.  Id. at 27.
administrative judges within an SEC-like agency, who would be authorized to broadly enforce
both disclosure obligations and certain rules against self-dealing (such as the insider trading
prohibition).  Such judges would be trained within the agency and would be empowered to
impose substantial civil penalties.  Their jurisdiction could be limited to enforcement cases
brought by the agency, or it could be expanded to include suits by investors for restitution.114
Although these judges would presumably lack criminal law jurisdiction, they could also be
authorized to grant bar orders that could effectively suspend or disbar an individual or entity
from the functional activity of being a broker, investment adviser, accountant, or attorney or from
having any association with any entity that engaged in these activities.  As a further backstop,
persons who knowingly engaged in such specified activities with such a defendant after the time
of the entry of the bar or suspension order could face similar penalties.  Further, appeal of such
orders or decisions might only be made to the jurisdiction’s court, which would be authorized to
reverse it only on a finding that it was without any factual or legal support.  
At this point, the agency acquires an in-house enforcement arm that lacks only the
traditional judge’s power to issue injunctions.  Indeed, “cease and desist” orders could be
authorized that partly fill even this gap.  The remaining problem may be how to enforce bar or
suspension orders.  In transitional economies, a broker or investment adviser barred from that
activity may persist in soliciting customers, effecting transactions, and giving investment advice. 
One answer may lie in centralizing trading on a more easily monitored exchange and penalizing
persons who work with or for the suspended person.  Another answer may be to allow
114 In civil law countries, there is no right to a jury trial which is the
factor most responsible for limiting the jurisdiction of administrative law judges in
civil cases in the United States.
customers and counter parties to rescind transactions (or refuse to pay for losing transactions)
with any barred, suspended or unauthorized person.  Whatever the means used, enforcement
problems can be solved, so long as the agency does not have to depend on (or can be nullified by)
the traditional judiciary.
B. Structural Reforms. Even if legal rules cannot be predictably enforced in transitional
economies, other structural mechanisms might be used to prevent the kind of systematic
expropriation that characterized the Czech experience.
1. Phased Privatization. The Polish experience with NIFs- - in effect, state-created
controlling shareholders- - may supply a useful model for a more gradual form of privatization.
Such controlling shareholders could serve several distinct functions: (1) they prevent (or delay)
the scramble for control that characterized the Czech experience- - at least until the legal and
regulatory structure has gained some experience with privatization; (2) they may constitute more
active monitors than private investment funds; at a minimum, they can at least be charged with
the mission of developing a restructuring plan for their portfolio companies, and  (3) they serve
as a means of aggregating individual shareholders and thus partially solving collective action
problems.
Ultimately, however, true privatization requires that the NIF wither away- - or else firms
would still remain under indirect state control. Thus, a strategy for a phased downsizing of the
NIF is necessary.  Here, the Polish model was incomplete, because it gave the NIFs a ten year
life, but did not provide for the gradual shrinkage of their controlling blocks. Instead, a subtler
approach might have been to reduce their stakes from the 33% starting point on an annual basis:
i.e., down to 30% after year one; 25%, after year two; 20% after year three, etc. In addition, it
might be wise to stagger this schedule so that some NIFs downsized and disappeared faster than
others- - thereby creating a natural experiment and permitting legislative or regulatory reforms if
the first generation of NIFs to disappear gave rise to a series of scandals.  Such a phased
reduction makes more sense than simply turning the NIFs over to private owners at a single
stroke, as this approach invites the same rent-seeking struggle for control as occurred in the
Czech funds.
Another attraction of this approach is that it should encourage foreign portfolio investors
(who will not seek control and know they cannot actually manage portfolio companies) to remain
active in the equity market and possibly become a monitoring substitute that over time could
collectively replace the state-created NIFs.  Still, the overriding attraction of this approach is that
it is “self-enforcing” and does not require judicial implementation in order to discourage rent-
seeking control contests.115
2.  Stock Exchange Listing Standards.  Long before there was an SEC in the United States,
the New York Stock Exchange (and the London Stock Exchange) had succeeded in winning
investor confidence.  They did so by imposing relatively rigorous disclosure and listing standards
and transparency requirements that exceeded those prevailing in other markets.  Exchanges do not
have ideal incentives, however, for the task of enforcement.  They profit on trading volume, and
they compete to list companies.  Similarly, their incentives to take enforcement action against
powerful broker-dealers may also be  suboptimal.  For these reasons, at least in a transitional
economy, the control over listing standards may better belong with a government agency.
115 I use “self-enforcing” here in the same sense as that term was
originally used by Professors Black and Kraakman. See Black and Kraakman,
supra note13.
Here, the contrast between the Czech and Polish experiences is particularly instructive. 
As of late 1998, only 253 companies traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, while some 1,716
firms traded in the Czech market in 1996- - a nearly 7:1 ratio, despite the fact that the Polish
economy dwarfs that of the considerably smaller Czech Republic.116 Yet, the Prague Stock
Exchange was forced to delist over 75% of its companies in order to maintain its credibility.117
Of course, if exchange trading is restricted, substitutes will develop, including  formalized
over-the-counter markets.  Such markets may be risky, and characterized by dubious offerings
and practices.  So be it.  Their potential failure should not jeopardize the higher quality market. 
Indeed, markets may naturally self-segregate into high quality and lesser quality markets.  In
times of economic stress, the lower quality market should incur the greater decline.
Such a pattern would both permit significant privatization (greater, in particular, than that
yet experienced in the highly tentative Polish system), without exposing the principal securities
market to the same risk of a Czech-style collapse.  Enforcement resources might also be
concentrated on the higher quality market to maintain its reputational integrity.  One goal of this
effort would be to convince foreign portfolio investors that the higher quality market could be
trusted and to encourage their investment in it.
3.  The Optimal Monitor.  The Polish and Czech experiences represent polar extremes. 
Essentially, the Czech privatization process relied on highly entrepreneurial, but legally
unconstrained, monitors in the form of investment funds that more or less spontaneously arose. 
116 See text and notes supra at note 26 and note 48.
117 See Pistor, supra note 6, at 39 (1,301 of 1,716 Czech firms delisted
under pressure from regulators). 
In contrast, the Polish approach was to rely upon highly constrained, state created NIFs, whose
entrepreneurial skills and incentives remain unproven.  Neither choice seems optimal.  There is,
however,  a third obvious candidate: the existing foreign portfolio investor.  Not only do foreign
institutional investors have relatively scandal free histories (and reputations that they wish to
preserve), but there is evidence that they make superior monitors.  One recent study, using data
from India during the 1990s, finds that foreign institutional investors significantly outperformed
domestic financial institutions as corporate monitors.118  Domestic financial institutions, it
concluded, had insufficient incentives or skills to monitor management or play any effective role
in corporate governance.  In contrast, foreign institutional ownership proved to be positively
correlated with changes in Tobin’s q (while domestic financial ownership was actually negatively
correlated with such changes).119  Such a finding that domestic financial institutions play only a
modest monitoring role is essentially consistent with the Czech experience and with similar
findings about Russian privatization.120
Equally important, this study found that foreign institutional investment only occurs
under circumstances of high transparency (for example, institutions tend to avoid investment in
affiliated business groups).  Hence, a stock exchange with rigorous listing requirements and high
transparency seems likely to attract the most effective and experienced corporate monitors.  In
118 See Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu, Emerging Market Business,
Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance, (NBER Working Paper 6955
February 1999).
119 Id. at 19.
120 See generally, R. Frydman, E. Phelps, A. Rapaczynski, and A.
Shleifer, Needed Mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Finance in Eastern
Europe, in  Economics of Transition 171 (1993).
turn, as stock exchange listing is seen to attract foreign equity capital, the willingness of other
companies to list and accept such conditions may increase.  To be sure, this strategy has its
limitations: small capitalization corporations and small market countries tend to be ignored by
institutional investors.  But that is no reason to reject a partial answer.  
More can, of course, be done to attract foreign investors.  While the use of voucher
privatization was politically necessary at the outset of privatization for a variety of reasons,
contemporary sales of the remaining state-owned shares in partially privatized enterprises might
be made through auction sales to which foreign institutional investors were specifically invited.
C  Legislative Reform.  The Czech experience with “tunneling” does suggest that at least
the German civil law system of corporate governance unnecessarily exposes minority
shareholders to risks of expropriation. The key problems center around disclosure and
enforcement.
1. Overview.  Because concentrated ownership systems of corporate governance have few
companies in which a majority of the shares are held by public (i.e., non-controlling)
shareholders, their focus has been on protecting the minority shareholder from the controlling
shareholder, not from management. Management, it is assumed, can be controlled by the
supervisory board. Hence, German law does not authorize an American style derivative action in
which a small shareholder and cause the company to sue management. This role is instead given
to the supervisory board.
But privatization inherently creates publicly held companies with dispersed ownership,
and hence it gives rise to the danger of managerial expropriation (possibly through a conspiracy
with some large shareholders). In short, there is a mismatch: a system of legal rules designed to
deal with concentrated ownership works less well when confronted with the new phenomenon of
dispersed ownership.
2.  Disclosure. German law does provide that a managing director is liable if the director
intentionally or negligently fails to prevent the corporation to its disadvantage from doing
business with a company affiliated with the director.121  But German law does not obligate the
director to disclose any personal financial interest that the director has in a proposed transaction
to the company.122  Even when disclosure is required (as it is in the case of transactions of
parent corporations and its majority owned subsidiaries within a “Konzern” or affiliated group),
disclosure must only be given to the supervisory board, not the shareholders. This makes any
right to sue largely academic if shareholders lack the knowledge that will cause them to raise
objections. This critique is by no means new or novel and has long been raised by German
academics , themselves.123  Yet, even if disclosure were required (as surely it should ) and even if
a derivative action were permitted, it might have little impact unless American-style contingent
fees were permitted- - and this seems unlikely, given the shock that civil lawyers express at such
a system. As discussed below, disclosure to shareholders should be required , and might be
enforced through listing standards.
121 I here rely on the advice of Professor Theodor Baums of the
University of Osnabruck for this proposition, who cites me to Section 93 of the
German Stock Corporation Act.
122 I again rely on Professor Baums for this statement. See also
Ekkehard Wenger and Christogh Kaserer, “The German System of Corporate
Governance- - A Model That Should Not Be Imitated,” (Working Paper) at 27-29
(discussing absence of disclosure obligations under German corporate law and
weakness of German proxy system).
123 See text and note supra at note 96 and note 110.
3.  Self-Dealing: Listing Standards Versus Prophylactic Rules.  A consensus seems to
exist that it is unrealistic to place high expectations on either the judiciary or independent
directors in transitional economies.124  Judges are likely to enforce satisfactorily only bright-line
rules.  Thus, it seems ill-advised to make proof of intent or purpose or bad faith necessary
elements of any cause of action, as this increases the unpredictability of results.  But this premise
leads to two immediate problems: (1) U.S. and U.K. law do not bar self-dealing transactions, but
rather subject them to a variety of highly nuanced standards, and (2) In many transitional
economies, affiliated business groups are the norm, meaning that intra-corporate transactions
within such affiliated groups will be common.  Yet, such transactions can often be used to
expropriate wealth from minority investors.
This dilemma could be addressed in a number of ways.  Corporate law could simply
preclude self-dealing (or make it so legally uncertain as to place a prohibitive penalty on it).  This
was essentially what U.S. law did as of the late-19th  Century, when the U.S. was itself a
transitional economy.125  Potentially, such a prophylactic rule would last only for the time it
took the transitional economy to mature (which is again the U.S. experience).  But this approach
might require dismantling of all affiliated groups, and this could be economically disruptive and
politically impractical.
The other, more feasible alternative would be state-imposed listing standards that kept
124 For a strong and sensible statement of this view, see Black and
Kraakman, supra note 13, at 1925 to 1927.
125 The shifting attitude of U.S. law and the progression from flat
prohibition of fiduciary self-dealing to greater tolerance is described in Harold
Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?  Conflicts of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. Law. 35 (Nov. 1966).
members of affiliated business groups off the “high quality” exchange, at least if their
inter-company transactions reduced transparency.  This would place a considerable cost on
self-dealing (by denying members of affiliated groups easy access to the equity markets), but the
cost is probably not prohibitive.  Those firms that truly found membership in an affiliated group
to be efficient could probably still obtain equity capital from the over-the-counter market.  More
importantly, this option forces a firm to choose between a “dispersed ownership” versus a
“concentrated ownership” governance system, and it signals to institutional investors that a high
quality equity market is intended to accommodate only firms that elect into the former system.
Supplementing this prohibition on listing members of an affiliated business group (other
than the sole parent) would be listing rules precluding defined self-dealing transactions by
management, controlling shareholders, or other insiders.  Such rules would, of course, focus only
on (i) transactions that were material to shareholders (excluding, for example, ordinary
compensation), and (ii) transactions that could be easily monitored (for example, purchases and
sales of corporate divisions or significant corporate assets by persons affiliated with
management).  Some low-visibility transactions would escape the scope of these rules, and some
violations would inevitably escape detection.  But if the enforcement of such rules were delegated
to the jurisdiction’s securities commission (rather than the exchange, itself), this system could be
implemented with respect to the largest and most important corporations in the jurisdiction- -
without relying on costly and uncertain litigation.  Over time, such a system could create its own
culture of compliance, with smaller firms seeking to elect in as they matured.  In effect, entry into
the “high quality” market would constitute a bonding device by which firms could assure
investors of fair treatment and thereby lower their cost of equity capital.
4.  Control Acquisition.  Following repeated scandals in the Czech securities market,
reform legislation was adopted in 1996 that essentially introduced a key element of the British
corporate governance system: namely, no person could cross a defined ownership threshold,
except by making a tender offer for all the firm’s shares.  Polish law interestingly already had
such a limitation from its outset.126  Under the Czech legislation, once any person crossed any of
the 50%, 66 2/3%, or75% ownership thresholds, such person is required to make a public tender
offer for the remaining shares within 60 days thereafter at a price equal to the weighted price on
the market over the prior six months.127  Conceptually, this protects the minority, but there
would seem to be serious flaws in the particular design of this system.  For example, control can
easily be obtained well short of the 50% level, at which point the controlling shareholder can
begin to exploit the minority (by withholding dividends, by engaging in self-dealing transactions,
etc.).   Once such conduct occurs or is signaled, the company’s stock price should predictably
decline.  Thus, when the controlling shareholder elects to cross the 50% threshold, the stock price
should already be deflated below its true “going concern” value.  As a result, for this remedy to
work, an earlier threshold (say, 20%) seems necessary.
Under a legal regime that allowed shareholders to aggregate shares up to 25%, but required
126 Poland uses a 33 1/3% ceiling, which is a more meaningful
definition of actual de facto control; also, this level corresponded to the amount
assigned to the lead NIF in each privatized company. See Pistor, supra note 6, at
37-38.  
127 Ironically, the Czech law already limited any investment
privatization fund to a 20% ownership of the equity securities of any firm. See
Coffee, supra note 33. But these rules were easily evaded, either by using multiple
funds run by the same investment manager or, ultimately, by deregistering as a
fund and becoming an unregulated holding company.
a public tender offer for the remainder, many would stop at the 25% level.  This does not seem
undesirable.  Some evidence suggests that such large, but noncontrolling, shareholders enhance the
value of the firm by partially solving the collective action problem inherent in dispersed
ownership.128  In a world where legal controls are weak, drawing such a line may be the most
practical reform that can be easily monitored and enforced.
  Yet, to work, more must be required than simply mandating that a tender offer must be
made at the average price over a recent period.  Such a rule allows the large shareholder to profit
from undisclosed material information and may be spurned by suspicious minority shareholders
who suspect that the firm has hidden value.  Although full disclosure should, of course, be
required in connection with this offer, full disclosure in this context can have a
counter-productive, even perverse effect: if shareholders learn that the firm has greater value than
the market previously had recognized, they will spurn the offer- - and thereafter be exposed to
exploitation by the new controlling shareholders if it succeeds in obtaining a controlling interest. 
Accordingly, some minimum tender premium needs to be mandated.  For example, a 20%
premium over the prior average market price might be the best practical compromise.  This will
lock-in some shareholders at the 20% level, who might have been more efficient corporate
monitors had they been able to obtain a controlling interest. Still, it protects the public minority
from the “rent-seeking” contests in which the participants are principally seeking to realize the
private benefits of control.
Some will object that this approach is inefficient because it chills the market for corporate
128 See Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and
Corporate Control, 94 J. Pol. Econ 461 (1988) (finding firm value in U.S. firms to
be maximized when there is a large but noncontrolling shareholder).
control and precludes some potentially efficient acquisitions. This cost seems highly speculative,
but it must in any event be balanced against the economic and political externalities caused by
rent-seeking control fights between contenders who are primarily seeking to realize the private
benefits of control. When majority ownership gives one the de facto right to expropriate the
minority shareholder’s stake in the company, it seems best to require control seeker to offer to
acquire 100% of the stock and thereby remove the company from the public market.
CONCLUSION
Why do common law systems outperform civil law systems in encouraging dispersed
ownership?  To be assessed intelligently, this question must be broken down into its
components.  Although the premise that different legal systems encourage different patterns of
ownership and different systems of governance seems valid, the truth is that we do not yet fully
comprehend the manner in which common law systems provide superior protection for minority
shareholders.  Indeed,  the answers may differ widely among common law systems.  Yet,
although no simple formula seems likely to be soon discovered, a major part of the answer seems
to lie not in their corporate law, but in their shared system of securities regulation. Although the
laws of the U.S. and the U.K. are far from identical and each regulates control contests quite
differently, they each seek to discourage this type of rent-seeking control contests that became
endemic in the Czech Republic.  The key elements of this system - - ownership transparency,
high disclosure standards, restrictions on “creeping control” acquisitions that preclude a
shareholder from assembling a controlling block without tendering for all shares, and high listing
standards - - were at least partially present in Poland, but were absent from the Czech Republic.
More generally, privatization has produced a conceptual mismatch: inherently, it
produces an initially dispersed ownership, but under a legal regime intended to accommodate
concentrated ownership. The result is necessarily short-lived. In this light, the critique advanced
by LaPorta and others that civil law systems fail to provide minority protection needs to be
re-formulated.129  Civil law systems may well protect minority shareholders against the forms of
abuse long known in systems of concentrated ownership (most typically, domination by a
controlling shareholder). But civil law systems do not address abuses that they have not
witnessed (such as the theft of the control premium in an exploitative partial takeover).  Hence,
they leave public shareholders in a system of dispersed ownership exposed to a “winner-take-all”
scramble for control. Privatization, of course, creates just such a system of dispersed ownership
that is vunerable to this form of abuse. More generally, the voting, proxy and disclosure systems
under the German civil law approach do not contemplate that small shareholders will play any
active role. This premise may be valid in their environment, but when this system is applied to
privatized companies, it forces the transition to concentrated ownership. Rather than seeing this
transition as inevitable, policy planners must recognize that it is a product of the dominant forces
in the legal and market environment.
Whether there are differences in judicial style and performance between common law and
civil law systems seems more debatable. One problem with any such comparisons is that the
presumed homogeneity of common law systems also seems suspect.  The U.S. and the U.K. have
achieved functional convergence, but not formal convergence. The effective absence of litigation
remedies in the U.K. that are available to minority shareholders suggests that the combination of
high disclosure standards and an active, unconstrained takeover market may constitute an
129 See sources cited supra at note 2.
effective functional substitute for litigation (or other remedies that are more available in the U.S.).
Legally, as much may separate the U.S. and the U.K. as unites them. To the extent that one is
skeptical of the ability of the judiciary in transitional economies to restrain opportunism, the
strategic answer must lie in the use of  “self-enforcing” remedies, and the Polish NIFs may
supply the best feasible example of such a structural reform.
Academic attitudes are clearly changing.  Where not long ago concentrated ownership was
seen as efficient and dispersed ownership was taken by some to imply overregulation of
institutional investors,130 today concentrated ownership is now being viewed by others as a
measure of weak protection for minority shareholders.  Predictably, academic fashions will
change again, but the critical issue is an applied one: how to establish strong securities markets? 
Here the data from the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis suggests that minority protection
appears to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to the emergence of viable securities
markets.131
The bottom line as usual is that those ignorant of history are destined to repeat it. “Fast”
privatization unaccompanied by minority protection and adequate disclosure standards will
produce expropriation and rent-seeking. To call this inevitable is only to claim that ignorance is
inevitable.
130 See Mark Roe, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: The
Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (1994).
131 See text and notes supra at notes 83 to 87.
